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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]indfall as a term for an unexpected piece of good fortune goes
back to medieval England, when commoners were forbidden to
chop down trees for fuel. However, if a strong wind broke off
branches or blew down trees, the debris was a lucky and legitimate
fmd. 1
In common usage, a windfall is a "casual or unexpected acquisition or
advantage," or an "unexpectedly large or unforseen profit." 2 A rare
discussion in the legal literature did not stray far from the dictionary,
defining a windfall as "value which is received by a person unexpectedly as
a result of good fortune rather than as a result of effort, intelligence, or the
venturing of capital." 3 This definition, however, adds critical economic
content to the term: It distinguishes gains due to luck from those due to
effort or enterprise. This Article defines windfalls as economic gains
independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society
wishes to reward.
The common law has long provided clear protection for the fruits of
labor, planning, and risk-taking. Property and tort law protect Farmer
Black's wheat crop from theft, negligent destruction, and other harms
traceable to wrongful human conduct. Contract law protects Black's right to
transfer the wheat in a private bargain for whatever price the market will
bear. Modem constitutions, via contract and just compensation clauses, and
modem statutes, in myriad ways, have further expanded protections for
private property.
Perhaps surprisingly, Farmer Black receives as much legal protection
for manna fallen from heaven or, to use a less religious hypothetical, for a
golden meteor that falls onto Blackacre. Most commentators simply
presume, in passing, that the law treats property obtained by luck no
1. WILLIAM MORRIS & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE
ORIGINS 605 (1977). For an equivalent etymology, see ROBERT HENDRICKSON, THE FACTS ON
FILE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 722 (1997).
Commoners' right to take windfallen wood was far from universal in medieval England.
Local forest wardens, as a perquisite of office, sometimes had the right to sell "wind-fallen
wood." CHARLES R. YOUNG, THE ROYAL FORESTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 78 (1979). At other
times the Crown claimed the proceeds from sales of windfallen timber. See id. at 115, 126, 170.
2. 20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 378 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. The OED traces
usage back to Erasmus, who used the term to describe inheritance as a windfall. See id. (citing
THE APOPHTHEGl\ffiS OF ERASMUS (Nicolas Udall trans., London, Robert Roberts 1877) (1542)).
Under the economic definition of the term, it is not so clear that inheritance is a windfall. See infra
Subsection IV.B.2.c. The OED traces the modern use of the term "windfall" to describe
extraordinary and unexpected profits to JOHN MAYNARD KEYNEs, The General Theory of
Employment Interest and Money, in 7 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
57 (rev. ed. 1973). See OED, supra, at 378.
3. Comment, Taxation of Found Property and Other Windfalls, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 748, 748
(1953).
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differently than it treats ·property earned through effort. In upholding the
constitutionality of a Washington, D.C., rent control law enacted during
World War I, Justice Holmes noted that the measure would deprive
landlords "in part at least of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of
people to Washington caused by the needs of Government and the war, and
thus of a right usually incident to fortunately situated property." 4 A recent
scholarly discussion of the famous Coronation Caseg5 notes in passing that
although "this asset came to [apartment owners] by the purest windfall, it
was entitled to no less protection than any other species of property." 6
Thus, Richard Epstein accurately describes a "uniform rule [that] leaves the
thing with its founder, without any effort to isolate luck from skill." 7
I take issue with this deeply ingrained notion, both as a positive
description of the law and as a normative prescription for the law. Some
legal rules do-and should-dictate that the state capture windfalls, i.e., tax
them away from their lucky recipients and redistribute the gains to the rest
of the population. Part II develops a theoretical framework to demonstrate
that such sharing of windfalls is sometimes desirable. Societal capture of
windfalls, by definition, does not affect incentives to engage in productive
activity and therefore does not discourage effort or enterprise. Windfalls,
compared to earnings, are thus an attractive source of revenue. Moreover, to
the extent that citizens are risk-averse, they will desire, if possible, to share
windfalls rather than leave them with a few lucky individuals. There is no
private market mechanism for redistributing windfalls (a hypothetical
product that I label "reverse insurance"), despite these desirable attributes,
because parties experiencing gains are unlikely to report their good luck. In
contrast, those with ordinary insurance have clear incentives to report bad
luck covered by their policies. I label this the "reporting problem" ; it
explains why society cannot count on the market to redistribute windfalls.
The state, however, can redistribute windfalls. Society must weigh the
benefits against two types of costs incurred in capturing and redistributing
windfalls. First, there are significant transaction and administrative costs.
4. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) (emphasis added).
5. The Coronation Cases involved contract disputes arising from the cancellation of
celebrations in honor of the coronation of King Edward Vll (who became ill days before the
scheduled festivities). Parties that contracted for rooms along parade routes, boats able to cruise to
the "illumination of the fleet," and similar services wished to rescind contracts and recover down
payments. Sellers of these services, of course, wished not only to retain down payments, but to
receive balances due. The primary case was Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A. 1903), which
held that a party letting rooms along the parade route could retain the down payment but that a
contract was otherwise rescinded because its purpose had been frustrated. For citations to 10 other
opinions on contracts frustrated by the King's illness, along with extensive background on the
disputes, see R.G. McElroy & Glanville Williams, The Coronation Cases, 4 Moo. L. REv. 241
(1941).
6. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 1, 26 (1991).
7. Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 17, 18 (1988).
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Second, any sharing regime that accidentally affects earnings, as opposed to
windfalls, will create disincentives to effort and especially to planning.
Another important limitation on capture is that, more often than not,
one person's windfall is another person's loss. Unfortunately, golden
meteors fall from the sky much less frequently than people find the property
of others, receive overpayments, or benefit from other "redistributionary"
windfalls. I label cases where the number of parties to a windfall is small
(including both losers and winners) "private windfalls."
Part III first explores how courts have used and abused the windfall
label. By failing to appreciate the extent of parties' planning, and the
productivity of such planning (recall the definition, above, of a windfall as
an "economic gain independent of work, planning, or other productive
activities"), courts often find a windfall where none exists (Section III.A).
Contracts, primary tools of planning, are always incomplete. Courts create
unintended windfalls when they construe contracts without assuming that,
had they anticipated subsequent events, risk-averse parties would have
adopted terms avoiding (instead of creating) windfall gains for one side and
losses for the other (Section III.B). Legal rules sometimes leave windfalls
where they land in order to serve larger social goals: Permitting finders to
keep property when the true owner is unidentified encourages fmders to
take control of lost items and attempt to locate the owner; permitting
victims of negligent acts to recover from injurers as well as from their
insurers preserves tort law's incentives to take reasonable precautions
(Section III. C). While society might wish to recover other private windfalls,
the same reporting problem that prevents a market in reverse insurance also
makes capture of private windfalls unattractive. All the state accomplishes
by imposing a tax on private windfalls is to impose transaction costs on the
few parties who must act in concert to keep the windfall secret
(Section III.D).
"Public windfalls" involve cases where the number of winners and
losers is large. Unlike private windfalls, capture of public windfalls is
feasible. Any gain that looks like an economic rent, from higher oil prices
resulting from the activities of a foreign cartel to increased wartime demand
for apartments, presents an attractive target for taxation and redistribution.
Section IV.B explores a wide variety of contexts in which governments
have engaged in windfall capture. Section IV.C examines slightly different
situations, such as eminent domain and punitive damage awards, where
legal rules should and often do permit the state to buy goods or encourage
efficient behavior at market cost instead of at negotiated prices that would
allow a lucky few to reap windfalls.
Societal capture of public windfalls was not practical when states were
relatively weak and lacked the information or organizational apparatus
necessary to separate windfalls from earnings. As governments have
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developed, however, they have become more and more capable of capturing
public windfalls.
II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPTURING WINDFALLS
There are two reasons why, in an ideal world, the state would capturetax away and redistribute-windfalls: (1) They are a nondistortionary

source of revenue; and (2) risk-averse citizens will desire sharing windfalls
as a sort of "reverse insurance." I defend these propositions in Section II.A.
Reality, however, imposes significant constraints on even the modem
state's ability to capture windfalls: Transaction/administrative costs and the
possibility of creating disincentives to productive activity (especially
planning) may outweigh the benefits of windfall capture. I examine these
costs in Section II.B.
A. The Desirability of Capturing Windfalls: Optimal Taxation and
"Reverse Insurance"

Almost any tax causes consumers to change their behavior. This
process leads to economic losses above and beyond tax revenues-" excess
burden" or "deadweight loss" in the jargon of economics.8 A tax on
chicken causes some consumers to substitute, for example, pork, which
they might otherwise prefer not to eat; a wage tax causes workers to take
leisure time that, in the absence of the tax, they found less attractive than
additional income. Whenever taxes cause individuals to alter their behavior,
society suffers such deadweight losses.
Conversely, the less a tax changes behavior, the less deadweight loss it
imposes. All else being equal, it is efficient to tax goods for which demand
is inelastic-unresponsive to price changes-since consumers will simply
pay more rather than switch to a less preferable substitute.9 Thus, a tax on
the insulin that diabetics require to survive, while perhaps inequitable, is
efficient in that it generates less deadweight loss than taxing most other
goods.
Taxing windfalls is efficient for precisely the same reason that taxing
insulin is efficient: It leads to little if any distortion in private behavior and
thus imposes little if any deadweight loss. Windfalls by definition are
unearned surprises. 10 Taxing unearned income does not undermine
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PuBUC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 277-96 (5th ed. 1989).
9. See id. at 293.
10. It is the unearned feature that defines windfalls. The phrase "unearned surprise" may
seem redundant Most surprises are unearned (windfalls), and most earnings are expected. There
are, however, examples of unsurprising windfall-type gains (for example, an expected inheritance)
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incentives for effort and enterprise; taxing surprises cannot distort agents'
economic planning. "Of great appeal to economists are taxes that capture
some portion of windfalls to individuals. If these windfalls are due to
chance or luck, then taxing them may be less likely to distort behavior than
would other taxes." 11 Windfall taxation is nondistortionary since it can only
be imposed ex post, after a windfall, which is by definition an unanticipated
event. "[T]axing past transactions means that future behavior may be less
distorted .... The central idea is that allocative efficiency is served when
taxpayers are unable to shift their activities in the face of a tax." 12
One court made precisely this point in ruling that insider trading profits
recovered by a corporation were taxable income. The key to the ruling was
that the corporation's recovery fit within the statutory definition of income
as "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." 13
We see no reason for not giving the statutory language its natural
meaning, as to the money here in question. It was, to be sure, a
"windfall" to the plaintiff. If Congress were to select one kind of
receipt of money which, above all others, would be a fair mark for
taxation, it might well be "windfalls." That would not penalize
industry nor discourage enterprise or economy as taxes on wages,
salaries and profits do. 14
Windfalls are in some ways akin to economic rents-returns to assets
that "exceed the minimum amount necessary to keep it in its present
employment." 15 The most fertile tracts of land, to take the classic example,
can produce com at a cost below market price, since market price is
determined by the least productive acre in production (the "marginal"
acre). This divergence between cost and price gives rise to rents. The cost
of windfalls is by definition zero, and thus earnings from windfalls are
and surprise earnings (for exan~ple, a stock in a consciously diversified portfolio that exceeds
expectations, or a seller landing a big contract after working hard on the deal while still
calculating the odds of success as well below 50%). That a gain is a surprise, however, supports a
presumption that it is an uneanied windfall.
11. Gene Steuerle, Progressive Taxation and Windfall Incomes, 62 TAX NOTES 1197, 1197
(1994); see also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv.
509, 556 (1986) (" [T]he revenue effects of windfall taxation may make it desirable because such
benefits might exceed [costs] in terms of the optimal trade-off between incentives and riskspreading.").
12. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 273 (1993).
13. Park & Tilford Distillers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 941, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (quoting
26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1946)).
14. Id. at 942 (emphasis added). The Park & Tilford court held that the payment of insider
trading profits to a corporation from an officer under section 16(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 is
taxable income under section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1934. The court failed to note
one reason Congress might not have viewed corporate recovery of insider trading profits as a
windfall: Section 16(b) clearly aims to recruit corporations as private attorneys general so as to
deter insider trading. To the extent that such lawsuits serve public ends, they are not windfalls.
15. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 485 (3d ed. 1985).
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rents. The most important point, for purposes of efficiency analysis of
windfall capture, is that the taxation of rents does not alter agents'
economic decisions.
Not all rents are windfalls. An oil company that engages in calculated
risks and discovers a field yielding oil at a cost far below market price will
reap rents, but they are earned rents, and hence they are not a windfall.
Michael Jordan commanded an eight-digit annual salary for playing
basketball because of his unique talents; his wage for any other activity (for
example, playing baseball) would have been considerably lower. Yet he
invested considerable time in honing his skills and exerted effort every time
he played. Hence, his salary was not a windfall under this Article's
defmition.
Even if windfalls exceed the government's budgetary needs, there is a
second reason for society to capture windfalls: individuals' risk preferences.
There is a widespread belief, buttressed by extensive empirical evidence,
that people are risk-averse: They are willing to trade off chances for large
gains to insure against large losses. 16 Thus, for example, most people do not
invest their savings only in very risky enterprises; rather, they choose
instruments more likely to experience moderate gains and unlikely to go
bust. Property owners pay insurance premiums in hopes that they will never
file a claim and thus never recover premiums paid.
Leaving windfalls "where they fall" means that a few individuals
experience large gains while most receive nothing. Ex ante, before anyone
knows who will be the lucky recipients of windfalls, risk-averse citizens
will not fmd appealing the idea of leaving windfalls where they fall. They
will prefer to capture the windfalls and distribute them evenly over the
entire citizenry. I label such a redistributionary scheme "reverse
insurance." Like insurance it spreads the "risk" of surprises, though
insurance spreads the risk of unpleasant surprises while windfall capture
and redistribution spreads the "risk" of pleasant surprises. 17
Those unfamiliar with economic theory may be puzzled by this
symmetric treatment of bad and good luck. The word "risk" may be one
source of confusion, since its popular use is limited to bad luck. It is
important, then, to note the benefits that citizens obtain from windfall
capture even assuming everyone is risk-neutral. By raising revenue via a
nondistortionary tax, windfall capture reduces deadweight losses. It will
16. For an accessible theoretical discussion of risk aversion, see id. at 203-09. The huge and
varied markets for insurance are perhaps the strongest evidence that most individuals are riskaverse. Insurance markets and similar mechanisms give rise to "[t]he general presumption in
economics ... that people are risk-averse over gambles affecting a significant proportion of their
wealth." ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & EcONOMICS 63 (1988).
17. While in common parlance the word "risk" is associated with the possibility of only
adverse outcomes, in economics and finance it refers more generally to unpredictability and thus
includes favorable as well unfavorable possibilities.
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also reduce the tax bill (be it income tax, sales tax, or whatever other levy
the windfall tax displaces) of the vast majority that do not enjoy significant
windfalls. The expected size of this reduction is far from trivial. First, some
individual windfalls are large (for example, during its heyday the Windfall
Profit Tax on Oil, discussed in Subsection IV.B.2, raised over $126 billion
in 1998 dollars, or roughly $550 for every American then alive). Second,
the aggregated value of numerous modest windfalls may be significant.
The popularity of lotteries is sometimes taken as evidence that many
people are not risk-averse. It is important to remember, however, that many
of the same lottery players betting a couple dollars a week also spend
significantly more on indemnity insurance for their homes, cars, and other
possessions. Lotteries may reflect small-scale irrationality or demonstrate
that people are risk-loving with a small part of their wealth but, as shown
by the prevalence of insurance, risk-averse as to the bulk of it. Edward
McCaffery offers an intriguing explanation for the popularity of lotteries: It
is rational for relatively poor people to use a few marginal dollars each
week to provide them with some (if limited and actuarially unfair) hope of
the good life. 18
Although it is possible to explain lotteries and other seemingly riskloving behavior as either minor deviations from the standard assumption of
risk aversion or as no deviation at all, studying windfalls raises another
issue: Are people's preferences the same for upside risk as for downside
risk? That is, do they wish to share upside gains the same way that they
wish to share downside losses? Economic theory, as noted above, treats
risk, upside and downside, as symmetric, and thus it suggests that people
would like to share windfalls just as much as they like to insure against
downside risk. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question about the
nature of common predilections. We will return to this issue after
illustrating important similarities, and differences, in pooling upside versus
downside risk.
There are pervasive parallels between spreading the risk of bad luck
and sharing the bounty of good luck. Consider the following table, which
illustrates when conventional insurance does and does not make sense.

18. See Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wrs. L.
REV. 71, 93-99.
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TABLE 1. CONVENTIONAL INSURANCE

Large
Losses

Small
Losses

Frequent
Infrequent
Types of Losses
Types of Losses
Hell: uninsurable and
The paradigmatic case for
hopefully uncommon.
insurance: The modest
Either the world has gone premiums of the many
to hell, or the insured are are sufficient to pay the
unusually accident-prone claims of the unfortunate
or negligent.
few.
Administrative/transaction costs make insurance too
expensive.

Since pooling risks via insurance involves nontrivial administrative costs,
insurance works only to spread larger potential losses. If a certain type of
large loss occurs quite frequently, however, insurance again becomes
unworkable since the size of premiums begins to approach the size of
losses. There is little point for insured parties to shuffle funds into a central
pool when most of them will make claims roughly equal to their
contributions.
Now consider a parallel table breaking down the viability of reverse
insurance based on the size and frequency of windfalls.
TABLE 2. REVERSE INSURANCE

Large
Gains

Small
Gains

Frequent
Infrequent
Types of Gains
Types of Gains
Heaven: Frequency is
The focus of this Article:
strong indication that
This is a paradigmatic
gains are due to effort and case for reverse
enterprise and hence not
insurance.FUsk-averse
windfalls. By definition,
individuals pool bounties
very few people are
just as they pool
systematically lucky.
downside risk.
Administrative/transaction costs make reverse
insurance too expensive.

Just as the costs of administering insurance make conventional insurance
coverage infeasible for small losses, one thesis of this Article is that, given
such costs, windfall capture makes sense only for larger windfalls. Again
following conventional insurance, I posit that windfall capture makes sense
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only for infrequent types of gains. Recurring gains are likely due to effort
and enterprise and hence, by definition, are not windfalls.
Another important similarity between conventional and reverse
insurance is that in both cases, limiting "coverage" in various ways is
important to avoid perverse incentives. For conventional insurance, this is
the ubiquitous moral-hazard problem: Coverage may give insured persons
inadequate incentives to take cost-effective precautions. 19 Homeowners
may not take simple low-cost steps to prevent fires, such as installing
smoke detectors; a fully insured car owner may park on the street instead of
in a safer garage; a contact-lens wearer with insurance against loss may
exercise less care in keeping track of the lenses. To minimize these
problems and avoid unnecessary losses, insurance companies may require
their customers to take certain measures (for example, installation of smoke
detectors) or leave them with some risk of loss (for example, deductibles or
coinsurance, so that an insured party is not covered for 100% of a loss).
For reverse insurance, the analogous moral-hazard problem is that an
overly broad definition of windfalls will lead society to take not only
surprise income, but also income resulting from effort and enterprise. This
outcome would create serious disincentives to create wealth. For example,
from a risk-sharing point of view, it might make sense for all the graduates
from a class of the Harvard Business School to agree to share their incomes
after graduation, since luck will undoubtedly play a role in their relative
earnings. Effort and enterprise, however, also play a significant role in
determining who earns what, and such a sharing contract would wreak
havoc on incentives to be productive. Capture ideally would be limited to
wealth gained purely by good fortune. The key here, as with the moralhazard problem in conventional insurance, is to provide coveragecapture--only for random events beyond the control of the insured.
Given the myriad similarities between conventional and reverse
insurance, it is perhaps surprising to fmd an incredibly rich market for the
former and absolutely no market for the latter. The absence of a reverseinsurance market to share windfalls makes a prima facie case that people
simply do not desire such sharing. There are, however, complications
facing a reverse-insurance market that are not present in a conventional
insurance market. These sources of market failure, as opposed to consumer
preferences, likely explain the lack of a private market mechanism for
sharing windfalls and justify governmental measures to provide reverse
insurance.
19. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 65-66 ("Moral hazard is the name for the
problem that arises when the behavior of the insuree changes after the purchase of insurance so
that the probability of loss or the size of the loss increases."); STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 194-97 (1987) (discussing the moral hazard problem and some
partial solutions).
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First, to avoid mangling incentives, reverse-insurance contracts must be
considerably more complex and variable than conventional insurance
contracts. Life insurance deals with one very simple and easily identifiable
event: death. Casualty insurance, whether for boats, cars, homes, or other
property, similarly deals with another easily identifiable event: damage to
property. Insurance companies can use mass marketing, boilerplate
contracts, uniform claim procedures, and the like to pool risks cheaply. In
contrast, reverse insurance would require terms that varied from case to
case. What constitutes a windfall, as opposed to earnings, will vary
extraordinarily from wheat farming to doctoring to steelmaking. The costs
of serving as the insuring hub in a series of "spoke" contracts with
variegated insured parties may swamp the benefits of sharing windfalls.
Even if reverse-insurance companies could set up a series of contracts
with enough individuals to share windfalls effectively, they would face a
second and perhaps more serious reporting problem. In both conventional
and reverse insurance, the insured party is in a good position to observe
losses or gains, while it is quite expensive for the insurer to detect events
that trigger loss coverage or gains sharing. There is a radical difference,
however, in insured parties' incentives to reveal events invoking the policy.
Under conventional insurance, the insured party obviously has every
incentive to report losses-she stands to collect money. Under reverse
insurance, the opposite holds: The insured party will have to share a
windfall if she reports it, and hence she has absolutely no incentive to report
her good fortune. To the extent that it is prohibitively expensive for insurers
to detect windfalls, this dooms any private market for reverse insurance.
Given market failure, there is a role for government intervention to provide
some of the benefits of windfall capture that a risk-averse citizenry desires.
Thus, the paucity of markets for sharing windfalls cannot be taken,
without more, as evidence that people simply do not wish to do so-that is,
that people are not risk-averse with respect to upside risk. To the contrary,
Part IV presents a series of instances in which democratically elected
governments have implemented complex schemes designed to spread
unearned gains over .the entire populace. To the extent that democracy
works and official acts reflect popular will, these episodes constitute
empirical evidence that people generally are risk-averse as to upside, as
well as downside, risk.
A government wishing to effectuate reverse insurance would put the
population on notice that it stands ready to tax away windfalls. As long as
the government limits capture to windfalls as defmed in this Article, such a
policy will not affect anyone's behavior: The government will act only for
events not planned for or anticipated in even a statistical sense. While a
reverse-insurance program would have little, if any, impact on asset prices
the day it was announced, it would prevent property from appreciating after
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the property benefited from a windfall. Buyers would know, or should
know, that the government is likely to tax the windfall no matter how many
times it changes hands. Hence, the value of the windfall will not be
capitalized into the price of the asset. 20
Before discussing limits on even the state's ability to capture windfalls,
it is important to note that optimal taxation and risk preferences provide
efficiency reasons for capturing windfalls: If properly implemented, they
improve social welfare. The redistribution of windfalls, of course, does not
increase the aggregate amount of goods available. Capture provides less
tangible but equally important benefits: a less burdensome means of raising
revenue and a reduction in the volatility of personal incomes.
The case this Article makes for windfall capture, then, does not rely on
any controversial notion of equity, fairness, justice, or the like. There is, of
course, wide disagreement about what is equitable, fair, or just; such
notions are subject to debates at least as old as recorded political thought.
Efficiency arguments have much broader appeal precisely because they rely
on the relatively uncontroversial proposition that people prefer !!lOre stuff,
less burdensome taxes, and less risk. 21 This is especially true when, as with
windfall capture, the rules are likely to sprinkle the incremental wealth over
the entire population, improving everyone's welfare. 22
B. Limits to Capturing Windfalls
The previous Section briefly touched on two limits to windfall capture.
First, administrative and transaction costs make capturing small windfalls
unattractive. This was the sum and substance of the bottom row in Tables 1

20. "[C]apitalized into the price of the asset" means that the price of the asset has been
adjusted to reflect some lmown present or possible future influence. Thus, for example, when the
value of a parcel of land rises due to the discovery that it likely contains a gold mine, we say that
the likelihood of the mine's existence has been capitalized into the price of the land. Similarly, the
mortgage interest deduction has made homes more valuable and has undoubtedly been capitalized
into home prices. For an amusing and deceptively profound discussion of capitalizing the value of
the mortgage interest deduction into property prices, see BORIS I. BITTKER, Tax Shelters and Tax
Capitalization or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, in COLLECTED LEGAL EsSAYS 547,
547-52 (1989).
21. Efficiency does have its critics. See, e.g., Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?, 24
VAL. U. L. REv. 147 (1990); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
485 (1980).
22. A policy that leaves at least one person better off without harming anyone exemplifies
efficiency in the strongest sense of the word: pareto efficiency. Windfall capture, considered ex
post, is not pareto efficient since it leaves the windfall recipient worse off. Considered ex ante,
however, windfall capture that does not require excessive adminstrative costs is efficient under
two less demanding standards: Societal gains exceed losses (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency), and over
the long term covering many windfalls, everyone is statistically likely to be better off if the state
captures windfalls (quasi-paretian efficiency). For a general discussion of these and other
definitions of efficiency, see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND TilE LAW 95-132
(1988).
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and 2. In general, a society should capture windfalls only if the benefits
exceed the costs. Capture makes the most sense for windfalls that are large,
easy to detect, and easy to redistribute. Note that the rise of the modem
state, with its better information and extensive tax infrastructure, means that
the costs of capturing windfalls have fallen over time.
The second limit on windfall capture discussed above involves
incentives: To the extent that decisionmakers err in distinguishing windfalls
from gains due to effort and enterprise, individuals will have diminished
inducement to work hard and produce wealth. And the line between
windfalls and earnings is not always easy to draw. There is no dichotomy
between windfalls and earnings; rather, there is a continuum. As discussed
in Subsection IV.B.2.c, heirs under intestacy statutes may look like windfall
recipients. While the efficiency arguments for allO\ving them to retain their
inheritances may be weaker than the argument for beneficiaries identified in
a will, many of the same considerations are in play, such as encouraging the
living to work and to save.
One way to think about limiting the definition of windfalls is to
imagine what factors very careful, thorough, and prudent investors would
capitalize into asset prices. If some contingency that relatively careful
investors might have anticipated increases the value of the property. then
this possibility was probably capitalized into the price of the asset. There is
then no windfall, but merely reward commensurate with risk taken. On the
other hand, some events are real surprises. They are either completely
unprecedented, or they had such extraordinarily low odds of occurring ex
ante that even very careful planners would not have accounted for them.
For instance, I will argue in Subsection IV.B.2 that the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) success in limiting supply and
raising oil prices in the early 1970s was largely unexpected. While it is true
that" [e]veryone knows that unanticipated benefits are worth having at least
to some degree," 23 such surprises by definition do not enter into planning,
effort, or enterprise.
It is important to realize the breadth of factors that careful investors will
consider and capitalize into asset prices-and that all such planning is
productive activity and hence not a windfall under this Article's definition.
For example, Kaplow has argued powerfully against providing transitional
relief to taxpayers harmed by revisions to the Internal Revenue Code, and
he has symmetrically argued against a windfall tax on those benefiting from
such changes in the law.24 The tax code changes almost constantly, and thus
23. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as
Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85, 123 (1992). Epstein agrees that "the
social losses generated by not creating the property right [for unanticipated benefits] seem fairly
small." Id.
24. See Kaplow, supra note II, at 551-53.
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it is difficult to argue that careful investors do not weigh a wide variety of
tax contingencies in their decisions. Similarly, changes in consumer tastes,
which affect demand, and technology, which affect supply, are difficult to
forecast, yet one of the keys to business success is making superior
estimates of these fundamentals. 25 Taxing away gains to those who more
accurately anticipate consumer demand creates serious adverse incentives
for entrepreneurship.
On the other hand, the government on rare occasions may truly surprise
virtually everyone with a sudden change in the tax code. Similarly, changes
in the fundamentals determining supply and demand may come completely
out of the blue and catch even the most meticulous planners off guard.26 In
such cases, windfall capture has the benefits discussed above and yet
creates little disincentive for effort or enterprise. While usually it is easy to
determine that somebody earned a gain, windfalls are much more difficult
to identify. Working in the gray region between obvious windfalls and
obvious earnings is costly for two reasons. First, there is the simple
administrative cost of making the determination, and, second, trying to
draw too fine a line is likely to create disincentives for effort and enterprise.
Thus, society should err on the side of defining close cases as earnings
rather than windfalls.
In a democracy, ultimately the electorate will draw this line. It may be
politically impossible to limit capture to true windfalls. Epstein doubts that
there is "any set of social institutions that can both authorize redistribution
by coercive means and then limit that redistribution to some sharply
restrained and desirable level." 27 This Article argues that, in theory at least,
economics provides guidelines for limiting capture and redistribution of
windfalls "to some sharply restrained and desirable level."
This thesis in one sense offers a limited, less controversial version of
John Rawls's theory of socialjustice.28 Rawls argues that, from "behind the
veil of ignorance," the distribution of individual talent is effectively
random-a windfall to those with superior intelligence, physical skills,
good looks, and the like.29 Philosophically, it is difficult to contest this
proposition. Who can argue that they in any sense earned fundamental traits
25. See NICHOLSON, supra note 15, at ch. 15 ("Market Demand") (demonstrating how
individual preferences are aggregated to construct the demand curve, and discussing empirical
efforts to model real-world demand curves); id. at ch. 7 app. ("Technical Progress") (discussing
the role of technological innovation in shaping the supply curve, and analyzing hypothesized
causes of technical progress).
26. The proliferation of derivative markets-in options, futures, and similar contracts for
stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies-has lowered the transaction costs of planning for an
uncertain future. Such instruments, however, have not banished surprises from the course of
human events.
27. Epstein, supra note 7, at 36.
28. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
29. See id.
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traceable to favorable genetics or environment? Economically, however, the
point is irrelevant. No matter how random the distribution of talents at birth,
significantly redistributing earnings (as opposed to windfalls) of the smart
or skilled dulls their incentives to plan and work, and likely reduces social
wealth. Put another way, Rawls attempts to articulate a theory of justice.
This Article limits itself to less controversial efficiency grounds for
capturing windfalls. That said, redistributionary notions of justice do
provide additional grounds to support this Article's defense of windfall
capture as sound social policy.
While leading to fewer recommendations for windfall capture than
Rawls, this Article is more optimistic than the other polar position, which in
effect argues that the costs of capturing windfalls always exceed the
benefits?0 Moreover, imperfections in democratic politics may well
produce suboptimal amounts of reverse insurance. While concentrated
groups facing losses can effectively lobby to socialize the costs of bad luck,
perhaps leading to excessive social insurance/ 1 in the case of good luck,
potential beneficiaries are numerous but diffuse and may be vulnerable to
lobbying by the few lucky recipients of windfalls.
Ill. PRIVATE WINDFALLS:
RARELY WINDFALLS, NEVER WORTH CAPTURE

This Part consists of a series of negative results on the possibility of
capturing private windfalls in which the number of winners and losers is
relatively small. It frrst demonstrates that, in private litigation, courts
frequently find a windfall where none exists by overlooking important ways
in which parties make plans (Section III.A). Granting remedies in these
cases undermines incentives to engage in productive planning. Contracts
are one of the most important legal planning tools available. Parties,
however, cannot anticipate every contingency-indeed, they cannot even
afford to try to consider most of them. Thus, when courts of necessity imply
terms for parties, they may create windfalls at odds with the parties' intent
if the judges fail to realize that risk-averse parties never desire implied
terms that produce lottery-like results (Section Ill.B).
When there is no judicial error and private windfalls do indeed exist, it
is often efficient to leave them uncaptured as part of overarching public
policies (Section Ill.C). Finally, even when they serve no such ends, their

30. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 28. Epstein admits that "[i]f there were a costless way in
which the consequences of bad luck could be spread across everyone in society at large ... then
most of us would pronounce ourselves better off for the change." I d. at 17. He goes on to argue,
however, that any scheme attempting to undo the effects of bad luck is "prey to greatD
institutional and practical impediments." ld. at 28.
31. See id. at 36.
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private nature makes it infeasible to capture private windfalls: Trying to tax
them away merely imposes transaction costs on parties as they struggle to
divide a pie that must remain hidden from the government (Section III.D).
A. Misuse of the Term Windfall: Failure To Account for Planning
1. Improper Ex Post Perspective
Mter the fact, many gains will look like windfalls. Prospectors may
seem to stumble across gold mines; investors may appear to have "lucked
out" by purchasing IBM stock in 1950 or Microsoft stock in 1985; real
estate speculators often look like fortuitous beneficiaries of regional
population movements. Yet speculators devote considerable skill and effort
to searching for gold; investors devote time to collecting information and
take considerable risks; and land speculators closely study growth patterns
and commit resources to assembling parcels of useful size and shape in
desirable locations. Examined from an ex ante perspective that properly
values planning, these are all productive activities that the law generally
aims to encourage. This Subsection examines cases where courts focus only
on ex post outcomes, leading to decisions that fmd windfalls where none
exist and redistributions of property that discourage productive planning.
Consider the facts of City of Everett v. Estate of Sumstad. 32 The sellers
of a safe knew it contained locked compartments, and their auctioneer so
informed bidders.33 Mter making a winning bid of $50, the buyers hired a
locksmith to open the sealed compartments.34 The locksmith found $32,207
in cash and turned the money over to the authorities. A majority of the court
awarded the money to the sellers, arguing that the contract between the
parties was for a safe, not for the safe's contents-that is, there was no
"meeting of the minds" concerning the concealed money. 35 Under this
view, the cash was a windfall to the buyers.
As the dissent noted, however, it is hard to imagine more objective
indicia of intent to sell the safe, contents and all, than the sellers'
knowledge, announced by the auctioneer, of the unexamined
compartments.36 The buyers introduced evidence that their bid in part
reflected a gamble that a locked and unopened compartment in a safe might
contain valuables. 37 They attended auctions frequently and may well have

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

614 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
See id. at 1295.
See id.
See id. at 1296-97.
See id. at 1299.
See id. at 1295.
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been speculators in property with potential hidden value.33 For every item
containing hidden value, they undoubtedly purchased scores of items worth
nothing beyond "face value." Forcing them to surrender their winnings is
no different from forcing the owner of a stock portfolio to turn in shares of
.the few companies that achieve spectacular results. Note that the holding in
Sumstad will dampen bids for safes and other items with potential hidden
value-thus forcing owners rather than dealers to bear (1) the risk that there
is no hidden value; and (2) the cost of determining whether there is such
value. This seems inefficient, since dealers are probably better risk bearers,
as repeat players, and able to determine value more efficiently?9
More egregious outcomes result when courts ignore clear contractual
terms to avoid outcomes they fmd unfair ex post and therefore deem
windfalls. The unfairness vanishes when we focus on the ex ante bargain
made by the parties. Brunmeier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange40 illustrates
one common scenario.41 The plaintiffs, the family of the victim of a fatal
on-the-job car accident with an uninsured motorist, collected $25,000 from
the employer's workers' compensation insurer.42 While the decedent's
personal auto insurance included $10,000 in uninsured motorist coverage,
the policy contained an express clause reducing uninsured motorist benefits
by any amount paid under a workers' compensation policy.43 The plaintiffs
sued to collect on the decedent's personal insurance policy, claiming that
the terms of the policy gave the insurer a windfall.
Bafflingly, the court declared that any way it ruled would result in a
windfall. It correctly noted that if it permitted the decedent's survivors to
recover on both policies, they would have reaped a windfall.44 It incorrectly
38. See id. at 1297. That the buyers anticipated at least the possibility that the safe contained
hidden value is central to the argument that they reaped no windfall and distinguishes Sumstad
from the true private windfall cases examined infra Section m.D.
39. Note that, counterintuitively, the buyers would have an even stronger case if they knew
that the safe contained cash. Presumably, they applied effort or skill to discover the existence of
unlmown resources. Such efforts, like high-tech explorations for oil, yield productive information.
To encourage collection of productive information, parties possessing it are not required to
disclose it to those with whom they trade. Thus, an oil company is not required to disclose its
knowledge that a field contains oil when it negotiates to buy the land usually using a "straw,"
since the oil company's identity would tip off the present owner that his land contained oil.
There is an important caveat in the Sumstad case, due to the fact that the plaintiffs
discovered cash as opposed to items with intrinsic value. "In the case of currency (as distinct from
treasure that has historical, aesthetic, or collectors' value), the optimal level [of search] is very
low, perhaps zero. Finding money does not increase the wealth of society; it just enables the
finder to have more of society's goods than someone else." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.2 (5th ed. 1998).
40. 208 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1973).
41. For similar cases, see Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance, 431 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1970); and Douthet v. State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance, 546 S.W.2d 156 (Mo.
1977).
42. See Brunmeier, 208 N.W.2d at 861.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 865.
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reasoned, however, that judgment for the insurer would also create a
windfall, reducing the insurer's liability based on the fortuitous existence of
a workers' compensation policy.45
While at first blush this may appear to be a windfall to the insurer, a
moment's reflection reveals that this is a contingency that the insurer
anticipated ex ante and addressed in an explicit contractual term. It is hard
to imagine a case of more thoughtful planning. Presumably the decedent
paid less for personal auto coverage in return for sacrificing double
coverage in those instances in which he was injured by an uninsured
motorist while working. Labeling this a windfall is nonsensical; the whole
point of contractual terms is to allocate risk as part of the total bargain
between the parties.46
Courts often improperly consider leasehold assignments and sublets
from an ex post perspective. A tenant who signs a multiyear lease at a fixed
rent will have a valuable asset if rents rise. Absent contractual language to
the contrary, tenants may assign or sublet the premises freely and charge
rent in excess of what they are paying to the owner.47 Landlords often
include lease provisions abrogating this default rule, giving them an
unqualified right to reject sublets or assignments.
Courts display a strong tendency to imply qualifications to a landlord's
right of refusal; they fear that free exercise of this right allows landlords to
reap windfalls. Courts often uphold a landlord's right to reject assignees or
sublettees when they have "commercially reasonable" objections,48 such as
"financial responsibility of the proposed assignee; suitability of the use for
the particular property; legality of the proposed use; need for alteration of
the premises; and nature of the occupancy, i.e., office, factory, clinic,
etc." 49 Otherwise, they deem it unreasonable "to deny consent in order that
the landlord may charge a higher rent than originally contracted for." 50
Letting a landlord charge a higher rent before a leasehold ends, due to
the seeming fortuity of a tenant's desire to assign or sublet, is a windfall in
the eyes of the courts.

45. See id.
46. Although the court claimed that the statute governing workmens' compensation insurance
supports its result, it failed to apply portions of the statute that explicitly permitted insureds to
contract for as much or as little uninsured motorist coverage as desired: "The named insured shall
have the right to reject in writing [uninsured motorist coverage] .... [A]t the option of the
insured, the uninsured motorist limits shall be equal to those provided in the policy of bodily
injury liability insurance of the insured or such lesser limits as the insured elects to carry." Id. at
862 n.l.
47. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PA1RICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 'JI 246
(abridged ed. 1968).
48. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 841 (Cal. 1985).
49. ld. at 845 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
50. ld. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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This is because the lessor's desire for a better bargain than
contracted for has nothing to do with the permissible purposes of
the restraint on alienation-to protect the lessor's interest in the
preservation of the property and the performance of the lease
covenants. [T]he clause is for the protection of the landlord in its
ownership and operation of the particular property-not for its
general economic protection ... [The landlord] here is trying to get
more than it bargained for in the lease.51
The courts' assumption that landlords include anti-assignment clauses
solely to screen for solvent and appropriate tenants seems unwarranted.52
Rent terms are central to any lease, and it is entirely possible that landlords
include anti-assignment clause~ both to screen tenants and to reap the
benefit of rising rents should the tenant desire to exit early. Tenants
presumably pay lower rent in return for giving up their right to take
advantage of rising rents.
By assumption, courts are inferring the unrevealed intent of the parties,
an admittedly imprecise undertaking. In this context, however, there are
good reasons to believe that landlords, often larger entities with diversified
real estate portfolios, are in a better position to bear the risk of fluctuating
rents. Landlords may do statistical analyses to figure how many tenants are
likely to exit early, and how early they are likely to exit. Thus, both the
terms of leases and the nature of typical parties to a lease suggest that
landlords do not reap windfalls when they refuse to permit assignment of a
leasehold so that they can raise the rent. By planning for such contingencies
and factoring them into the rents they charge, landlords provide benefits to
tenants as well as themselves. 53
51. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warner v. Konover, 553
A.2d 1138 (Conn. 1989) (holding that a landlord cannot unreasonably withhold consent for a
sublease); Jack Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941 (ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(same); Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990) (same). See generally POWELL &
ROHAN, supra note 47, 'l[17.04[1][b] (describing tenants' broad rights to assign and sublet).
52. Courts are not alone in making this unwarranted assumption; a leading treatise states that
anti-assignment clauses "are justified as reasonable protection of the interests of the lessor as to
who shall possess and manage property in which he has a reversionary interest and from which he
is deriving income." ROBERTS. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 8.15, at 578-79 (1980); see also POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, 'l[246 (suggesting that
landlords' rights to limit assignment or subletting be limited to substantive objections to the
proposed new tenant).
There may be rational grounds to impose a clear-statement rule requiring landlords to be
exceptionally forthright and explicit about an unqualified right to reject sublets or assignments.
Since they are generally better informed than tenants about the real estate market, the likelihood
of early exit, and other relevant facts, clear-statement rules may be a sensible way of prodding
landlords to share their knowledge with tenants. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989) (explicating the theory that default contract rules encouraging more knowledgeable parties
to reveal information are efficient).
53. Another misidentified windfall almost exactly analogous to lease anti-assignment clauses
came up in judicial treatment of mortgage due-on-sale clauses that effectively prevent a home
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The way parties deal with the major uncertainties surrounding litigation
often confuses courts and gives rise to another class of cases in which
courts fmd windfalls where none exist. Two similar cases reaching opposite
outcomes illustrate this type of error. The essential facts of Thick v. Lapeer
Metal Product~4 and Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Casualty
Insurance 55 are the same: A plaintiff had potential claims against two
insurers. It was possible that neither insured company was liable, that only
one of them was liable, or that both were liable. In both cases, one insurer
(label it I5) decided to settle while another Qabel it INs) decided not to settle
and proceeded to trial,56 and both cases resulted in judgments holding that
INs alone was liable for the plaintiff's injuries. INs in both cases maintained
that the court should deduct the amount Is paid the plaintiff (as a settlement)
from the damages due.
The Lapeer Metal court agreed and permitted INs to deduct Is's
settlement payment from damages, citing "the primacy of the policy against
double recovery .... 'To preclude credits would allow claimants to receive
windfalls."' 57 The dissent clearly explains why, looking at the case from the
proper ex ante perspective-given that settlement is obviously a method to
manage uncertainty in litigation-there was no windfall:
"At the time the redemption agreement was entered into ... both
insurers ... were potentially liable. [Jsl entered into the redemption
agreement to relieve its potential liability. The fact that the
[court] ... found ... no liability on the part of [Is] should not

buyer from taking over the seller's mortgage. In the rising-interest-rate environment of the late
1970s, courts in a number of states read in a reasonableness requirement and refused to enforce
the clauses. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978). The courts found it
unreasonable for lenders to be able to charge higher interest rates simply because a homeowner
decided to move. As with anti-assignment clauses, however, there is reason to believe that at least
part of the reason lenders inserted such terms was precisely to provide themselves with some
protection if and when rates rose. Like landlords, lenders, as players with large pools of loans,
seem in a better position than homeowners to calculate borrowers' average tenure in a given home
and thus manage the risk of fluctuating interest rates. Homeowners are likely better off accepting
lower interest rates and putting all the interest rate risk-upside and downside, given the
homeowner's right to prepay-on the lender.
Congress eventually preempted state law and mandated the validity of due-on-sale clauses in
the Gam-St. Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-230, § 341, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505 (1982) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994)). For a detailed history of this episode, see GRANTS.
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REALEsTATEFlNANCELAW §§ 5.21-5.24 (3d ed. 1994).
54. 353 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. 1984).
55. No. 92 CIV. 7327(JSM), 1997 WL 251548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997).
56. In Squibb, there were actually multiple insurers settling and not settling, but that does not
affect the analysis.
57. Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 467 (quoting Stanley v. Hinchcliffe & Kenner, 238 N.W.2d
13 (Mich. 1976)).
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negate the parties' understanding that the ... settlement was in
settlement of Us's] potential liability." 5 8
The Squibb court agreed with the reasoning of the dissent in Lapeer Metal.
Emphasizing the need to focus on the parties' decisions under pretrial
uncertainty, it refused to order the plaintiff to pay INs the settlement payment
from Is that
in hindsight turned out to be in excess of their legal
obligation.... [The plaintiff], in settling with Us], took something
less than it might have recovered had it litigated to the end against
the settling insurers and ran the risk that the amount it received in
those settlements would be less than it was ultimately obligated to
pay.s9

As the court in Squibb and a separate concurrence in Lapeer Metal
note, the decision to permit deduction of the settlement payment amounts to
a windfall for INs. 60 Worse, the Lapeer decision is inefficient in two respects.
Both courts noticed the first: Allowing nonsettling parties to deduct
settlement payments creates a disincentive to settle. 61 Second, the Lapeer
court's decision results in underdeterrence: Parties like those insured by INs
will not bear the full cost of the damages they inflict, and therefore, they are
likely to take less than optimal levels of precaution. Thus, the Squibb court
refused to deprive a claimant of a fairly-struck bargain that, ex post,
translated into a double recovery. 62

58. Id. at 469 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) (emphases added) (quoting Thick v. Lapeer Metal
Products, 302 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct App. 1981)).
59. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *2; see also Maryland Casualty v. W.R. Grace & Co., No.
99 CIV. 2613(JSM), 1996 WL 109068 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1996) (holding that a liable nonsettling
insurer could not deduct the payment made by a settling insurer).
60. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *2; Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 468-69 (Williams, C.J.,
concurring).
61. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *3; Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 467-68. It does seem that
the parties could contract around this disincentive to settle. Assuming that the plaintiff is riskaverse, it would be sensible for Is to offer more up front in return for a promise from the plaintiff
to refund part or all of the settlement if and when the plaintiff obtains a judgment against INs· The
plaintiff could thus "lock in" a fixed amount, while the settling insurer (instead of the plaintiff)
would bear a portion of the risk of the litigation with INs·
62. Other cases have correctly rejected windfall arguments made by parties in the context of
litigation uncertainty. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 441 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejecting an
argument that unexpectedly low claims filed in a class action should lead to an ex post reduction
of the settlement amount). But see Nelson v. Taff, 499 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Gartzke, J., concurring)
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (arguing erroneously that a bankrupt plaintiff obtained a windfall by settling
a claim with the trustee for cents on the dollar and then later recovering the entire claim plus
punitives from the responsible third party); id. at 692 (Sundby, J., dissenting) (same).
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2. Ignoring the Shadow That Law Casts over Bargaining
People often arrange their contracts and other affairs with one eye on
the legal environment in which they live. When courts lose sight of this sort
of planning, they erroneously label as windfalls gains earned by prudent
planning. Such holdings, like those examined in the previous Section,
undermine incentives to engage in the eminently productive activity of
planning one's affairs in compliance with the law.
Sometimes the errors are facile, yet buried in the twists and turns of
complex fact patterns. In Ink v. City of Canton, 63 for example, the state
condemned large portions of a public park that reverted to the grantor or his
heirs if the city ever stopped using the land as a park. The court had to
decide how to apportion the just compensation proceeds between the heirs
(Ink) and the city (Canton).
The court drew a distinction between sales and gifts, reasoning that
purchasers should receive the entire eminent domain award, while donees
should receive only the value of the land as restricted, with the remainder
going to the donor. 64 The latter rule, for gifts, may make sense based on
reasonable inferences about the donor's intent: Electing to place restrictions
on donated land evidences that the donor attached some value to the
restriction. Although the donor here, as in many cases, may not have
anticipated condemnation and thus did not insert a term to deal with such a
contingency, it seems reasonable to infer that most donors would prefer the
return of value they never donated.
The court's rule for sales, giving the buyer the entire eminent domain
award, however, is obviously erroneous. The court went astray when it
reasoned that "where the grantee paid the grantor the full value of the
property for the determinable fee ... giving the grantor any part of the
eminent domain award would represent a windfall to the grantor." 65 The
error is obvious: Who would pay "full value" for a restricted
(determinable) fee? Buyers of restricted fees pay lower prices, and hence
the court's rule results in windfalls to them, not to sellers. Whether acquired
by sale or gift, the owner of a defeasible fee received something clearly of
less than full (unrestricted) value. By incorrectly assuming that a purchaser
would pay full value for a restricted fee, the court erroneously worries that
giving any part of an eminent domain award to the grantor amounts to a
windfall.
Whether conveyed by sale or by gift, we must presume that the
restriction itself had utility to the grantor such that he preferred the land

63. 212 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1965).
64. See id. at 577.
65. !d.
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restricted to selling at a higher market price. The gift/sale distinction merely
tells us implicitly what the grantor wished to do with the value embodied in
the restriction: receive fair value himself or donate the same value to
charity. If and when the state condemns a restricted fee, the grantee, or his
heirs or assigns, should receive only the value of the land as restricted,
whether he bought the land or received it as a gift. To give a grantee the full
value of the land, as the court advises, creates a real windfall for the grantee
by avoiding an illusory windfall to the grantor.
One of the precepts for the Ink decision was a previous holding that
despite any use restrictions, the state must pay just compensation equal to
market value as if the land were not restricted. 66 Ironically, this earlier case,
Thormyer, correctly addressed a windfall issue quite similar to the one
mishandled in Ink. The Thormyer court noted that it would be a windfall to
the state if it could acquire land more cheaply by the happenstance of
private use restrictions. The court at first suggested that the landowner
would receive a windfall if just compensation paid her a price undiscounted
for restrictions on her use. In deciding to force the state to pay full market
value, however, the court zeroed in on the relevant source for its rule: the
intent of the grantor.
It cannot be seriously suggested that, if he had foreseen that
appropriation by the state, he would have wanted the state to
benefit from the restriction by being enabled to take the land for
less than it was worth. To give such an effect to the restriction
would be to completely ignore and distort the purpose of the donor.
The purpose he disclosed by his gift clearly indicates that, if he had
foreseen the appropriation, his intention would have been that the
restriction be eliminated in any determination as to what should be
made available by the state to replace the benefits he had provided
for those whom he intended to benefit, i.e., the occupants of the
county children's home. 67

Thus, the court was in effect doing no more than implying terms in the
grant to address contingencies that the grantor did not address explicitly.
Other incorrect findings of windfalls, such as the major justification for
the contemporaneous ownership requirement (COR) for derivative
corporate law suits,68 are rooted in circular logic that fails to realize the
law's role in private decisionmaking. The COR bars those who obtain
66. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer (In re Appropriation of Easement
for Highway Purposes), 159 N.E.2d 612, 619 (Ohio 1959)).
67. Thormyer, 159 N.E.2d at 618.
68. A derivative suit is "[a] suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (6th ed. 1990). Shareholders bringing derivative actions believe
the corporation has suffered an injury for which the officers in control, for one reason or another,
will not initiate suit.
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shares after the purported wrong against the corporation from instituting a
derivative suit; only owners who held shares at the time of the harm may
sue on the corporation's behalf. Thus, the COR prevents the right to sue
from "running with the shares" -a transfer extinguishes the power to bring
a derivative suit.69
In defending the COR, many courts reason that permitting buyers to sue
will result in a windfall: Investors will buy at a discount, reflecting the
corporation's reduced value due to the harm that gives rise to a suit, and
then restore the full value of the shares by a successful derivative suit?0 In
the absence of the COR, however, shares of corporations suffering
remediable harms would not sell at as much of a discount-any discount
would reflect only uncertainty about success on the merits of the derivative
suit. If the corporation was sure to win, buyers would bid up the price to
reflect the value of the flrm including future recovery for whatever harm
was done.71 Like the rationale in Ink, the idea that allowing later purchasers
of shares to sue for prepurchase harms can create windfalls rests on an
erroneous notion of how parties will strike bargains given legal rules.
Moreover, it is generally efficient to allow parties to transfer assets. In this
particular case, shareholders averse to litigation risk wish to sell, and others
wish to buy, shares with the right to sue attached.
A similar fallacy occurs when courts refuse to permit sellers with valid
inverse condemnation suits to sell the right to sue along with the property.72
If a new statute, ordinance, or administrative rule amounts to a taking, the
owner of the land at the time of enactment undoubtedly can bring an
inverse condemnation suit. Courts are split, however, on whether a

69. See 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRlVA1E CORPORATIONS § 5981 (perm.
ed. 1995).
70. See Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974); El
Dorado Bancshares v. Martin, 701 F. Supp. 1515, 1519 n.3 (D. Kan. 1988) ("[T]he determination
of whether shareholders can recover rests primarily on whether such a recovery would result in a
windfall ...."); Courtland Manor, Inc. v. Leeds, 347 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1975); Home Fire Ins. v.
Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb. 1903).
71. As long as a suit is possible, "[a]n element of the purchase price paid [would] be
attributable to the per share value of the possible corporate recovery." Paul P. Harbrecht, The
Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1041,
I 062 (1978). Similar reasoning leads Dean Clark to conclude that "it is difficult to justify the
continued existence of the contemporaneous ownership rule." ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORA1ELAW § 15.4, at 651 (1986).
72. Inverse condemnation refers to a suit by a landowner claiming that the state has taken
some action so intrusive that it amounts to expropriation. Since the state has not filed a direct
condemnation suit in order to take title and determine just compensation, the landowner may file
an inverse condemnation suit, asking a court to (1) rule that there has been a taking; and
(2) determine just compensation and order the state to make payment See POWELL & ROHAN,
supra note47, § 79B.03; 2AJULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 6.14 (rev. 3d
ed. 1998).
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subsequent purchaser may bring the same suit-that is, on whether the
inverse condemnation suit "runs with the land." 73
Some courts refuse to permit subsequent purchasers to sue, arguing that
such buyers, like purchasers of shares in companies that may have a right to
sue, will buy cheaply based on the restrictive effects of the new law and
then realize the unrestricted value of the land by successfully bringing an
inverse condemnation suit. "Any compensation received by a subsequent
owner for enforcement of the very restriction that served to abate the
purchase price would amount to a windfall, and a rule tolerating that
situation would reward land speculation to the detriment of the public
fisc." 74
This reasoning is deeply flawed. If buyers know the rule barring suit,
they will pay a reduced price reflecting the lower value of heavily regulated
land. Conversely, if buyers know that they may sue, they will bid up the
price closer to the full value of the land, possibly discounted for the cost
and risk of the necessary lawsuit. Windfalls will exist only when the courts
surprise the parties. If a buyer purchases when the general opinion is that
suits do not run with the land and subsequently convinces courts to alter the
rule, then the buyer arguably receives a windfall.75 As long as legal rules are

73. For examples of cases holding that a subsequent purchaser may sue, see Lopes v. City of
Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); and Moroney v. Mayor and Council of Old Tappan, 633
A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). For a general discussion and collection of cases, see
Stephen E. Abraham, Windfalls or Windmills: The Right of a Property Owner To Challenge Lond
Use Regulations (A Call To Critically Reexamine the Meaning of Lucas), 13 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 161 (1997).
74. Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997). In a similar decision
issued simultaneously, the same court argued that a buyer's "reasonable expectations were
reflected by his consideration of the inherent limitations on the property when he made the
purchase offer for thousands less than its worth without the restrictions." Gazza v. New York
State Dep't ofEnvtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (N.Y. 1997).
75. As with derivative suits and the contemporaneous ownership rule, efficiency
considerations weigh strongly in favor of permitting inverse condemnation suits to run with the
land. Alienability allows the party who most highly values the package of land and lawsuit to
obtain the assets. Some courts that permit subsequent buyers to bring inverse condemnation suits
explicitly discuss such efficiency concerns. See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1315 (arguing that barring
purchasers from bringing inverse condemnation suits "would threaten the free transferability of
real estate"). Massachusetts law may be less friendly to subsequent buyers after Leonard v. Town
of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300 (Mass. 1996).
The rules against suits by subsequent purchasers of shares or land are highly formalistic and
hence manipulable. If the rule barring subsequent buyers from suing became sufficiently
inconvenient, owners of shares or land could place their assets in a shell corporation. Instead of
selling the underlying asset, they could sell all shares of the shell corporation. The shell
corporation, not the underlying buyer, would (formally) own any cause of action; as a legal person
in existence at the time of the wrong to the corporation or the offending statute, the corporation
would have the indisputable right to sue no matter how many times the shares or land effectively
changed hands. This use of formalism to circumvent rules extinguishing lawsuits when lands
change hands rests on the universal power of corporations, as legal entities distinct from their
shareholders, to hold title to real property. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) (1991 &
Supp. 1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN.§ 3.02(4) (1984).
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predictable, prudent planning that accounts for those rules cannot lead to
windfalls.
B. Inefficient Enrichment: Avoiding Contract Interpretations That Create
Unintended Windfalls
Even the most prudently drafted contracts cannot cover all, or even
most, contingencies; there are simply too many variables in the world.
Thus, one of the primary purposes of contract law is to infer the likely
intent of the parties when confronted with circumstances not governed by
explicit contractual terms. Unjust enrichment and quasi-contract cases take
this tool to its limit, implying the very existence of contracts where none
exist. As the label "unjust enrichment" indicates, courts generally justify
implying contract-like obligations to prevent one party from reaping a
windfall at the expense of the other-indeed, courts often use the phrase
"windfall" as a synonym for "unjust enrichment."
This Section first summarizes existing work demonstrating that unjust
enrichment cases are appropriately decided on efficiency grounds: Courts
imply contracts when transaction costs are prohibitive but circumstances
make it likely that the parties would have struck a deal if they could have
bargained. It then examines a new class of cases in which courts should,
and often do, imply contractual terms: Assuming parties are risk-averse,
they would not desire provisions that lead to lottery-like outcomes where
one party gains at the expense of the other via a surprise. By implying terms
that avoid such results, courts enable parties to economize on the expensive
process of drafting detailed contracts. Finally, it shows that the same
reasoning supports rescissory remedies for contractual mistake, frustration,
or impossibility.
The law of restitution in general, and unjust enrichment in particular,
focuses on situations in which it is feasible to force recipients to cough up
unearned windfalls. "Restitution occupies the crucial ground between its
much-studied neighbors, tort ·and contract. Restitution deals with
nonbargained benefits; tort law with nonbargained harms; contract law with
bargained benefits and harms." 76 The universe of "nonbargained benefits"
covered by unjust enrichment alone, merely one branch of the law of
restitution, has always been a bit of a motley collection seemingly without a
unifying theme; it includes everything from provision of unsolicited
services to mistaken overpayments to contractual restitution for frustration,
impossibility or illegality.77

76. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 67 (1985).
77. For the most extensive survey of the field, see GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
REsTITUTION (1978).
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Courts deciding unjust enrichment cases often deem an unbargained-for
benefit a windfall to justify ordering restitution. While the very label and
most doctrinal analysis emphasize issues of fairness in deciding unjust
enrichment cases, efficiency provides a powerful prescription for how
courts should, and do, decide these cases.78 Under this reading of the cases,
the doctrine should be labeled inefficient enrichment, not unjust enrichment.
The key variable is transaction costs. If it is inexpensive for parties to
bargain, then they are expected to do so, and the law will not imply a
contract when, for example, a violinist plays under a stranger's window and
demands payment after the last note/9 when a neighbor asks for payment
after installing a water purification system in a common well, 80 or when
someone washes your windshield at a red light and requests payment when
finished. 81 While the recipient in each case receives a windfall,82 the law
effectively warns the provider that since low transaction costs make
bargaining feasible, the law will not imply contract-like obligations to pay
for services rendered.
When transaction costs are high, however, it is often sensible for the
court to imply the existence of a contract. When a doctor provides services
to an unconscious person on the street, for example, bargaining is literally
impossible.83 On the presumption that most people would request aid if they
could, courts will give the doctor the legal right to collect a fee, often under
the rubric of quasi-contract.84 Transaction costs may be high for many
reasons. If one ship happens across a sinking vessel, the two are in a
bilateral monopoly and may fight over the price of rescue, especially if the
value of the cargo in the sinking ship is much higher than the risk-adjusted
cost of rescue. Thus, the law of the sea implies a contract: Rescuers receive
the fair market value of their salvage services. 85 When transaction costs are
high due to the large number of parties, we have a public windfall,
discussed infra Part IV.
There is another sense in which transaction costs are always potentially
high: It is futile to draft contracts that explicitly anticipate every
contingency, and trying to do so is expensive. Modern contract scholarship

78. See POSNER, supra note 39, § 4.13.
79. See id.
80. See Levmore, supra note 76, at 71.
81. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1369,
1380 (1994).
82. Of course, one only receives a windfall if the music was enjoyable, the purification
system actually worked, and the windshield became cleaner as a result of the squeegee person's
efforts.
83. See POSNER, supra note 39, § 4.13.
84. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907); In re Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d
907 (Mich. 1961); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148 (R.I. 1994);
REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 116 (1937).
85. See 3A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY§§ 1-4 & 232-44 (Martin J. Norris ed., 7th ed. 1997).
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emphasizes the important role the law plays in constructing a large body of
default terms that govern parties in the absence of specific contractual
provisions. 86 The goal is to make contracting cheap by minimizing the
amount of dickering and drafting parties need to undertake.
Courts choose default rules that they believe the parties would have
chosen had they anticipated an unanticipated event. While this is often
difficult, widely held assumptions about risk preferences provide the basis
for strong presumptions about the likely intent of the parties. One of the
most frequently cited grounds for allocating a given risk is to determine
which party was in a better position to manage the risk, either by exercising
caution or by obtaining some sort of insurance coverage. Another riskallocation argument explains many unjust (inefficient) enrichment cases
where courts order restitution of a windfall: Courts assume that parties are
risk-averse and thus would not insert terms that in effect create a private
lottery between them.
One example comes from frequently litigated questions on the effect of
a death on survivorship rights in commonly held property during the
pendency of a divorce or after divorce when the final decree is ambiguous. 87
In the prototypical case, Husband and Wife (H & W) own their home as
joint tenants or tenants by the entireties. In either case, a surviving spouse
takes sole title if the other dies before dissolution of the cotenancy .88 Their
divorce settlement calls for a sale of the house and division of the proceeds,
but W dies before a court finalizes the divorce. Under a formal approach,
the marital tenancy has not yet dissolved, the divorce settlement is not yet
final, and thus H would walk away with the house despite his deceased
wife's wishes (as manifested in her will) to leave all her worldly goods to
her sister. Many courts decide these cases on precisely such formalistic
grounds.89
86. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 52 (discussing default rules); Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (analyzing impossibility, impracticability, and
frustration).
87. The frequency with which such cases are litigated is not necessarily tied to the stress of
divorce and resulting deaths during the (usually) relatively short period between initial filing and
final divorce decree, but because in some cases the divorce proceedings drag on for years, see,
e.g., In re Violi, 482 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1985), discussed infra note 89, or the final decree does not
resolve clearly the status of jointly held property.
88. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, '][ 617 (discussing survivorship rights among joint
tenants); id. '][ 624 (discussing survivorship rights between tenants by entireties).
89. For a typical example of this formal approach, see Violi, 482 N.E.2d 29, in which the
court awarded a house held by the entireties to the husband after the wife died. While the couple
had a divorce agreement calling for division of the value of the house, they remained separated for
years without legally dissolving their marriage. Thus the divorce agreement was never executed.
In addition to relying on the formality that the tenancy by the entireties had never terminated,
the court said that its holding rested in part on a "public policy favoring certainty in title to real
property." /d. at 32. While certainty of title would be relevant if a third party were involved, the
dissent points out that it has nothing to do with a dispute between co-owners.
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It seems very unlikely that the parties would desire a provision that in
effect gambled on deaths during the "executory" period before finalization
of the divorce. 90 Under the formal approach, parties to an unfinalized or
ambiguous divorce agreement obtain the opportunity for a windfall, if their
spouse dies first, but pay via a symmetric risk of a wipeout: Their heirs
receive nothing if they die first. The formal rule introduces significant risk
where there need be none. It seems quite likely that, were the parties to a
divorce agreement to contemplate the possibility of an unexpected death,
they would include a term dissolving the joint interest immediately. This
would assure both sides (and their heirs) of receiving negotiated shares of
the property. And in what one litigant characterized as "a developing
modem trend," 91 many courts are looking past formalism to the likely
desires of the divorcing couple. In Sondin v. Bernstein, for instance, a
couple continued to occupy different portions of the property after
divorce. 92 The settlement did, however, call for division of the proceeds
should the divorcees ever decide to sell the entire building.93 The court
admitted that the divorce settlement had not formally severed the spouses'
joint tenancy, but held that by contract-the divorce settlement-the
deceased husband's estate was nonetheless entitled to half the proceeds of a
sale.94
Gordon v. Mazur5 illustrates another context in which a court
dispensed with formalism and focused on the probable intent of the parties
in order to avoid a windfall that the parties likely never intended ex ante.
Co-owners of a building contracted for mutual rights of first refusal to buy
[The divorcing couple, H and W,] made clear their intent that the tenancy by entirety
between them be no longer continued and, the present contest being over whether [H)
should receive a windfall to the exclusion of [W's] heirs, no public policy with respect
to the protection of bona fide purchasers should play any part in our determination.
Id. at 33 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For other decisions following the formalist approach despite
evidence of the parties' intent to the contrary, see Kirven v. Reynolds, 536 So.2d 936 (Ala. 1988);
Jones v. Earnest, 819 S.W.2d 280 (Ark. 1991); Bruce v. Dyer, 524 A.2d 777 (Md. 1987);
Pavluvcik v. Sullivan, 495 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. App. Ct. 19S6); In re Estate of Sander, 806 P.2d
545 (Mont. 1991); Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); and In reMarriage of
Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. 1985).
90. Indeed, one way to recharacterize the formal approach is to analogize each spouse's
contingent right to obtain sole title as a strange sort of life insurance on the other. This
immediately raises an important question: Do separated or divorced spouses, still tied by an
undissolved joint ownership interest, have an insurable interest in each other's lives? The law
takes a dim view of those wishing to take out life insurance on those with whom they have no
familial or economic ties. See 3 GEORGE]. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D§ 41:1-:10,:17-:24
(LeeR. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 1997 & Supp. 1998) (describing the legal requirements of
an insurable interest).
91. Sondin v. Bernstein, 467 N.E.2d 926,929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
92. See id. at 928.
93. See id.
94. For other cases dividing proceeds after one spouse died despite the formal existence of a
tenancy with survivorship rights, see Wardlow v. Pozzi, 338 P.2d 564 (Cal. App. Ct. 1959); and
Mann v. Bradley, 535 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1975).
95. 131 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 1954).
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the other's interest at cost should one of thein desire to " sell, transfer or
assign" his or her interest.96 After the value of the building apparently had
appreciated, the defendant placed her interest in trust for a grandchild. The
court admitted that as a matter of law, she had undertaken a "sale, transfer
or assignment." 97
The Court nonetheless decided the case for the defendant on equitable
grounds, refusing to grant the plaintiffs request for specific performance.
Given the appreciated value of the building, the court found that the
defendant had made a mistake-she had not intended to invoke her coowner's right to purchase at cost.
While such a mistake might not avail the defendants in an action
for damages at law, it will not foreclose inquiry by a court of equity
into the justice of bestowing a windfall on one party because the
other party misconstrued the technical provisions of their
contract .... If [the defendant] is restored to her former status as a
co-owner the plaintiff will lose nothing but an uncontemplated
opportunity to gather in a windfall.98
The court felt justified in describing the plaintiffs potential gain as
"uncontemplated" because it found, apparently without objection by either
party, that they created mutual rights of first refusal to protect against being
forced into co-ownership with someone who might prove troublesome. In
fact, the trustee for the defendant's grandchild was the lawyer used by both
parties to manage the property.99 Given these facts, we might recast the
court's holding more lucidly as the determination that the phrase "sale,
transfer or assignment" in this particular contract really only meant a
transaction that led to a stranger being involved in managing the property as
a new cotenant.
The rationale behind Mazur is commonplace. Contract law frequently
implies reasonable rules to avoid unexpected results that would result from
strict application of contractual language. Though a land sale contract calls
for the parties to close on a given day, the law entitles either party to a
reasonable delay-without empowering the other side to rescind-to
overcome some difficulty, unless the contract explicitly makes time "of the

96. ld.
97. ld.
98. I d. at 265-66. The court also found it significant that the plaintiff knew of the defendant's
plan to place her interest in trust but did not invoke his right of first refusal until after she had
made the transfer. See id. at 264-65.
It is somewhat disturbing, and seemingly in~onsistent with the reasoning of the opinion, that
the plaintiff could recover damages. Perhaps the court could think of nothing better than the
law/equity distinction as a basis to rule for the defendant. The remaining discussion of the case
suggests an alternative reading that would preclude legal as well as equitable relief.
99. See id. at 264.
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essence." 100 The Uniform Commercial Code permits a supplier reasonably
to alter performance if the contractual mode of delivery becomes
impractical. 101 Such rules make sense for risk-averse parties and avoid
holdup problems ex post. They also save parties the trouble of inserting
boilerplate reasonable terms into every contract drafted.
Courts also apply unjust enrichment to cases of mistake. When, for
instance, A pays B' s electricity bill by accident, B must make restitution to
A. 102 There are two strong efficiency reasons for this rule. First, risk-averse
bill-payers prefer this rule to the alternative: a lottery in which a few
receive a windfall paid for by those who put down the wrong account
number on their check. Second, not requiring restitution will lead all billpayers to take excessive precautions when they prepare their bills-such as
checking the account number four times instead of twice. The extra minute
spent, multiplied by thousands or millions of customers, creates great
waste, and it likely exceeds the cost of requiring restitution in the few cases
of mistaken payment.
More commonly, mistakes occur not between unrelated customers of a
common supplier, but between parties to a contract. While the law is a bit
wary of permitting one party to rescind a contract based on a unilateral
error, in instances of mutual mistake the courts often permit rescission and
require restitution of any benefits conferred. 103 As Andrew Kull has argued
powerfully, the contract doctrines of impossibility and frustration are
substantively indistinguishable from the doctrine of mistak:e. 104
Most modern academic commentary and case law support the remedies
of rescission and restitution in cases of mistake, impossibility, and
frustration. The rationale, by now undoubtedly familiar, is that most parties
would contract for such a rule, given risk aversion, if they anticipated the
contingency that led to a mistake, made the contract impossible to
complete, or frustrated the purpose of the agreement. 105 Kull, in an elaborate
dissenting view, argues that the courts are unlikely to do a good job of
reconstructing what the parties would have done ex ante, and that by
implying terms courts create incentives for contracting parties to bargain
carelessly and superficially, since the court will later fill in their
omissions. 106 He argues that older English case law and sound policy
100. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-302(b)-(c) (amended 1977, 13 U.L.A. 523
(1986)); see POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, '][ 881[5].
101. See U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (1989).
102. See PALMER, supra note 77, § 14.17(a).
103. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) (discussing mutual
mistake); id. § 153 (discussing unilateral mistake).
104. See Kull, supra note 6, at 2-3.
105. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 103, §§ 151-158 (1981)
(discussing mistake rules); id. at §§ 261-272 (discussing impracticability and frustration rules);
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 86, at 117-118.
106. See Kull, supra note 6, at 38-54 ("The Trouble with 'Gap-Filling"').
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support his windfall principle: In the absence of a specific contractual term
specifying how to allocate a risk, let the gains and losses in cases of
mistake, impossibility, or frustration lie where they fall at the time the
problem arises. 107
In arguing that many private contractual windfalls are efficient, Kull
apparently believes that the mainstream view overestimates the transaction
costs saved due to default rules drafted by courts or legislatures. There is
strong reason to believe, however, that such savings are often significant.
The main justification for ornate corporate, partnership, limited liability
company, and other business organization laws is that they are collections
of off-the-rack rules designed to save each new enterprise the cost of
drafting a long and complex set of governance rules. 108 Just as the state
saves each new business enterprise the cost of reinventing efficient rules of
organization, it can help all contracting parties economize on planning costs
by interpreting contracts in light of the fact that people are generally riskaverse.
C. Efficient Windfalls: Serving Wider Social Goals
This Section deals with what seems the simplest class of cases in which
the courts correctly identify windfalls: B and C are fighting over property
that would best be given to a third party (A) not before the court. It is often
difficult or impossible (that is, expensive, perhaps prohibitively so) to
identify and channel property to the "true owner'' or "most deserving
party." While a ruling either way would appear to be a windfall, deciding
between B and C may also implicate important social policies. Such wider
concerns should and often do determine the outcome between B and C; the
winner prevails not because of the merits of his specific claim, but as an
instrument of other state goals. If it is too expensive to channel the property
to A, these decisions are efficient second-best outcomes.

107. See id. at 5-6 (stating Kull's thesis). While it sounds like a "four comers" approach (to
the extent that it looks to terms within the four comers of the contract, and no further), Kull's
approach is more nuanced. Older common-law cases show that a strict four comers approach has
no need for doctrines of mistake, impossibility, or frustration. See, e.g., Paradine & Jane, 82 Eng.
Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647) (requiring a tenant to pay rent despite eviction by an invading army). Kull,
however, accepts the need for rules to deal with mistake, impossibility, and frustration. He says
the need for special rules in such cases is "best explained as a judicial refusal to enforce contracts
beyond their original limits. Common sense sets limits to a promise, even where contractual
language does not" Kull, supra note 6, at 38. Kull apparently thinks that it is acceptable for
courts to assume that all parties would adopt this one term, but no others, to manage risk.
108. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 14 (1995)
(describing corporate law as "standard 'contracts"'); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE EcONOl\fiC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) (" [C]orporate law is a set
of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting.").
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When F finds property on L' s land, the two often end up disputing
ownership. The true owner holds superior title to F or L but is unidentified
at the time of adjudication. The property will constitute a windfall to
whichever party wins the case. 109 Although decisions resolving such
disputes form no cohesive, consistent doctrine, the true owner is never far
from the courts' attentions. Thus, the seemingly obscure rule that fmders
keep "lost" property while landowners keep "mislaid" property reflects
concern for the true owner. no The idea is that owners who mislay property
(for example, by putting it on a store counter instead of in their pocket) are
likely to return to the location where they mislaid it, while those that simply
lose property (for example, it falls out of their pocket) are much less likely
to return to a specific location seeking the item. m Thus, landowners or
finders win cases only as instruments of a policy designed to return
property to its true owner. 112
A.T. Switzer Co. v. Midwestern Construction113 is a contract dispute
analogous to such finders cases. Defendant Midwestern, a general
contractor on a government project, subcontracted painting work to
Switzer. It turned out that no painting was necessary, but Switzer sued to
enforce the contract anyway. The court permitted the defendant to rescind
based on mutual mistake. It was unreceptive to the subcontractor's
argument that rescission would leave the contractor with a windfall, noting
that permitting Switzer to enforce the contract symmetrically would be a
windfall to the subcontractor. The basis for the decision, it seems, was
minimizing administrative costs: " [l]f it is a windfall either to Midwestern
on the one hand or to Switzer on the other, the court will leave the parties
where it found them and will not lend its aid to shift the windfall from one
party to the other." n4
The record did not contain the contractor's bid, so it is unclear whether
the government could recover. Whether the government or the contractor

109. We assume that F is an invitee who "stumbled across" the property; ifF devoted
resources to unearthing the item, I argue (perhaps counterintuitively) that L has a stronger claim.
The idea is that the law encourages F to proceed via a market transaction with L (for example, by
buying the land, leasing it, or negotiating for the right to extract the valuables) rather than via
trespass or exploiting a license granted for one purpose to achieve other ends.
110. See, e.g., Michael v. First Chicago Corp., 487 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ill. App Ct. 1985);
McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548 (1866).
111. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THELAWOFPERSONALPROPERTY § 14 (2ded. 1955).
112. The rationale drawn in the text for the lost/mislaid distinction elides over much of the
complexity and confusion in the cases. For a more nuanced overview of the case law, along with
criticism of the purported policy grounds for the distinction, see R.H. Helmholz, Equitable
Division and the Law of Finders, 52FORDHAML. REV. 313,316-27 (1983).
113. 670 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
114. Kull argues that the maxim "let the gains and losses lay where they fall" expresses the
proper grounds to decide a wide variety of similar contract disputes (for example, cases of
mistake, frustration, and impossibility). See generally !Cull, supra note 6. I address his thesis
supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
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made the original mistake, the court's decision in effect preserves the
property so that it is more likely that the true owner (the government) can
recover funds that it would otherwise lose in a contractual error. The
government dealt directly with the contractor and would more likely spot
the error if the contractor could not provide an invoice from a painting
subcontractor. The decision also permits the government to proceed directly
against the contractor, instead of requiring it to reach a subcontractor with
which it had no contractual privity.
Insurance disputes frequently give rise to assertions that policyholders
are reaping windfalls in two ways. In the first, the insured has multiple
coverage for the same potential casualty loss. For instance, in Continental
Oil v. American Quasar Petroleum/ 15 Quasar had the rights, under a
"farmout" agreement, to drill for oil and gas on land owned by Continental.
The agreement called for the parties to share "costs" without defining the
term. In the course of drilling, Quasar had a blowout that cost over $2.5
million to fix. It recovered $2 million on a blowout insurance policy that
covered its wells all over the world. Unsatisfied, Quasar claimed that,
because blowouts were a "cost" of drilling, Continental was contractually
liable for half the $2.5 million cost of repairs. 116 Quasar, in effect, claimed
that Continental was a partial insurer for blowout losses.
The court agreed and held Continental liable for half the blowout
expenses as a "cost" under the farmout agreement. It noted that the
contract did not require Quasar to obtain blowout insurance, and the parties
apparently stipulated that Continental was not liable for the antecedent
premiums paid by Quasar.117 This gave rise to an inference that the parties
did not contract for Quasar to bear this risk alone. The court argued that,
from the proper ex ante perspective, any recovery in excess of loss would
not be a windfall for Quasar: 118 It in effect bargained with two separate
entities for double coverage and presumably paid for such coverage in one
way or another.
Casualty insurance exceeding losses, of course, creates perverse
incentives to cause accidents rather than avoid them. This is another version
of the moral-hazard problem discussed in Part II. Agreements that insure
against bad outcomes erode--or, when coverage exceeds losses, invertincentives to avoid such outcomes. Such stark examples of moral hazard are
rare because insurers usually take steps to rule out the possibility of surplus
coverage (for example, refusing to insure property for more than its
appraised value or voiding coverage if another policy exists). Indeed,
insurance law, under the indemnity principle, makes a strong presumption
115.
116.
117.
118.

599 F.2d 363 (lOth Cir. 1979).
See id. at 364.
See id.
See id.
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against excessive recovery from multiple insurers. 119 This legal presumption
seems sound: Parties buying insurance very likely prefer lower premiums
with recovery limited to actual losses over higher premiums along with a
chance to reap a double-recovery windfall.
Continental Oil is a case that apparently fell between the cracks of the
farmout and insurance contracts. Had the insurance company known that
the term "cost" in Quasar's farmout agreement with Continental included
implicit blowout insurance, it would have undoubtedly reduced its exposure
dollar for dollar. Quasar itself probably would have preferred such a term as
long as the insurer reduced its premiums accordingly-why would a riskaverse insured pay more in return for the chance to win a blowout windfall?
Similarly, why would Continental put itself at risk by creating incentives
for Quasar to cause a blowout, or at least to exercise less than optimal care?
The court's facile analysis of the two contracts (Quasar's farmout
agreement with Continental and its insurance contract) in isolation ignores
the terms that the parties would have chosen had they anticipated a
blowout.
A common way insurers avoid such windfall double recoveries is via
subrogation clauses that permit the insurer to bring suit against a wrongdoer
whose harm led to a policyholder claim. 120 Indeed, they are perceived as so
useful and desirable that the law will often imply subrogation rights when
an insurance contract does not explicitly include them. 121 Insurance
companies benefit by recovering from wrongdoers when economically
feasible; their policyholders benefit by the lower rates they receive for
agreeing to subrogation clauses. 122
Failure to consider subrogation has led numerous courts to object to the
collateral benefits rule as a windfall. Under the collateral benefits rule,
which is adhered to in a majority of states, 123 a tort victim may recover from
119. See ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BASIC INSURANCE LAW 121 (2d
ed. 1977). Keeton states:
The "principle of indemnity" ... is the principle that insurance is legitimately aimed at
conferring a benefit that is no more than an offset (total or partial) for accidental loss.
To be consistent with this principle, the benefit must be no greater in value than the loss
suffered, though it may be less than the loss.
Id. at 121.
120. There was no wrongdoer in Continental Oil-well blowouts are presumably acts of
God. See Continental Oil, 599 F.2d at 364. Thus, the insurer would need some other grounds to
extract Quasar's second recovery from Continental.
121. See 16 COUCH, supra note 90, § 62:1. To serve the same ends as subrogation clauses,
insurance contracts sometimes include reimbursement or repayment clauses, requiring the insured
to tum over to the insurance company any legal recovery against the wrongdoer. These
alternatives, however, may be less valuable than subrogation clauses since the insured must bring
suit instead of the insurer, yet has little incentive to do so when she must tum over any recovery to
the insurer. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 238-39.
122. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 235-37.
123. "The virtually universal rule in [America] has been to treat first-party benefits that
plaintiff has received as 'collateral' to the defendant's responsibility and not relevant to tort law's
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the wrongdoer, even if she has already received full compensation from her
first-party insurer (a benefit collateral to the wrongdoing). In the presence
of a subrogation clause or similar provision, there is in the end no double
recovery: The insurer pays the insured's claim and recovers in full from the
wrongdoer.
Problems arise when administrative and transaction costs make it
infeasible for insurers to include or apply subrogation clauses. Then a
plaintiff collecting from both an insurer and the defendant does reap a
windfall. Often, however, it is an efficient windfall. Denying insured
plaintiffs recovery from tortfeasors when subrogation fails would mean that
some tortfeasors will never pay for the damage they do. That will lead
potential injurers to take suboptimal precautions and thus to cause an
excessive number of torts. Allowing double recoveries is particularly
attractive when there is minimal concern that victims are inducing harms in
order to reap supercompensatory windfalls. 124
Underdeterrence is the ultimate effect of cases like Florida Physician's
Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley, 125 where the court allowed doctors found
liable for malpractice to argue that public assistance and private charity
mitigated the harm to a plaintiff child with serious physical and mental
disabilities. While these collateral benefits undoubtedly did reduce the
family's expenses, there seems little danger of moral hazard here: It is hard
to imagine how parents could raise the odds of malpractice in the fust
place, and it is equally implausible that they would desire a seriously
handicapped child in order to extract multiple recoveries from doctors,
charities, and the public fisc. The outcome permits doctors to externalize a
portion of the harm they inflict, leading to underdeterrence of medical
negligence.
Ideally, the public and charitable agencies providing aid would take at
least a portion of the malpractice judgment by subrogation. That was
apparently the court's thinking in Epps v. Mercy Hospital, 126 where the
plaintiff received coverage under her husband's health insurance for a
work-related accident covered by workmen's compensation. The court

determination of liability or damages." MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 676 (5th ed. 1992).
124. Continental Oil illustrated this moral hazard problem. See Continental Oil, 599 F.2d at
364. It is precisely in such cases that insurance companies are most likely to include subrogation
or reimbursement clauses.
One way to deal with moral hazard and deterrence is to have the state tax away any plaintiff
recovery beyond actual damages. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 238 n.9. I examine this
decoupling solution vis-a-vis punitive damages infra Subsection IV.C.2 . Decoupling may not
work in this context, however, since plaintiffs will simply obtain full compensation from the
source available at least transaction costs-invariably their insurers-and fail to bring suit against
the wrongdoer. Underdeterrence will result
125. 452 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1984).
126. 244 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
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declared that a judgment either way would amount to a windfall: double
recovery for the plaintiff or no liability for the insurer based on the
happenstance of other insurance. 127 The court remanded the case, directing
the trial court to find a way, if possible, to funnel the workmen's
compensation proceeds to the health insurer. 128
As discussed earlier, however, procedural obstacles and administrative
costs may make bringing a third party before the court impossible or
wasteful. More important than the occasional windfall to plaintiffs is
deterring potential injurers-this is what is meant by this Section's title,
"Efficient Windfalls." Courts sometimes reach this result by stating a
general preference for victims over injurers if one or the other must receive
a windfall. fu Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 129 for example, the court held that a
tortfeasor could not reduce its liability by the value of medical services the
victim received from the government under Medicare. " [T]he real question
is not whether there is a windfall, but rather who is to get it. As between an
injured plaintiff and a defendant, we have no hesitation in saying that the
former is entitled to prevail." 130 To restate this rule in economic terms:
Society gains more by tolerating double recoveries that serve deterrence
than eliminating such windfalls at the cost of underdeterring potential
tortfeasors. 131
D. Private Windfalls: The Reporting Problem and Transactions Costs
Not all private windfalls, however, implicate wider social policies.
Consider two famous contract cases that have tortured generations of firstyear students and many of the scholars teaching them.132 fu Wood v.
127. See id. at 343. Note that in Epps, unlike Brunmeier v. Fanners Insurance Exchange, 208
N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1973), the first-party health insurance apparently contained no clause
requiring the insured to tum over any workmen's compensation recovery.
128. See Epps, 244 N.W.2d at 343.
129. 585 P.2d 1182 (Wash. 1978) (en bane).
130. /d. at 1184.
131. Again, note that in health insurance cases, there is little fear of moral hazard: People are
generally unlikely to risk bodily injury in order to reap a windfall based on duplicate coverage.
The windfall varies directly with the injury and hence the insured would have to risk serious harm
to realize a large windfall. If feasible, Medicare should have subrogated rights against the injurer,
but as discussed above, this may prove too expensive.
For another case where the court allowed an efficient double recovery out of sympathy for
crime victims, see People v. Sullivan, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. Ct App. 1998), appeal granted
and opinion superseded, 955 P.2d 448 (Cal. 1998), which held that under a statute requiring
criminal convicts to pay restitution, convicts could not deduct payments from a victims' insurer.
The appeals court in Sullivan explicitly noted that the insurer could have included subrogation
rights against criminals in its policies. See id. at 445-46.
132. Most contemporary casebooks discuss the two cases and ask students to reconcile the
seemingly irreconcilable outcomes. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON
CONTRACTS 621-30 (6th ed. 1993); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 799-802 (5th ed. 1995); FRIEDRICH KEsSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 84-88, 886-98 (3d ed. 1986).
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Boynton, 133 the plaintiff seller could not recover a diamond already sold that
both parties had believed to be a topaz. In Sherwood v. Walker, 134 the
plaintiff seller successfully sued to rescind a contract for a pregnant cow not
yet sold that both parties believed was infertile. Professors and students
have puzzled over which decision is correct and over whether there is a way
to justify the seemingly contradictory outcomes.135
In a passing comment, Kull touched on the windfall nature of Wood and
Sherwood:
The discovery that a cow thought to be barren is with calf, or that a
supposed topaz is a diamond, is a clear gain to society; but whether
the property acquires its greater value in the hands of one person or
another will normally be a matter of complete social indifference. 136
To rephrase, unlike the examples in the previous Section, there are no
wider social concerns-like deterrence or returning property to its true
owner--over who gets the diamond or the pregnant cow. Yet, there are two
reasons that society might have an interest in the allocation of the windfall.
The first reason why society is not indifferent to which party receives
the pregnant cow or the diamond goes to the heart of the thesis of this
Article. In unjust enrichment cases, the surprise is that property ends up in
the hands of one party rather than the other; there is no surprise about their
joint wealth. In Wood and Sherwood, on the other hand, the parties,
considered together, experience a surprise increase in wealth-a windfall.
While, as the examples just discussed illustrate, this distinction does not
matter to parties fighting over the property, it is the thesis of this Article
that this distinction is socially important. As outlined in Part IT, windfalls
present an ideal target for tax revenue and for redistribution. Although there
is "complete social indifference" whether one litigant or the other receives
the pregnant cow or the diamond, a third choice may be socially desirable:
tax away the value of the windfall gain in each case.
Attempts to capture these private windfalls, however, are doomed to
fail: A version of the reporting problem that prevents the emergence of
reverse insurance for windfalls also prevents capture in cases like Wood and

133. 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885).
134. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). For recent scholarly commentary on Wood and Sherwood,
see David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case for Mistake and the
Indeterminacy of U.C.C. Section 1-103,43 ARK. L. REV. 291 (1990); Hoffman F. Fuller, Mistake
and Error in the Law of Contracts, 33 EMORY L.J. 41, 58-62 (1984); and Ke~eth L. Schneyer,
The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual Mistake, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 429 (1997).
135. Kull offers a powerful rationale for both outcomes that resolves the paradox: In both
cases the court left everything as it was at the time the parties discovered their mutual mistake. All
transfers up to that point were valid, but all future obligations disappeared. See Kull, supra note 6,
at 5-6. I analyze his wider and more controversial thesis supra notes 104-108.
136. Kull, supra note 6, at41.
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Sherwood. In these "contract" windfalls, two parties know of the windfall,
and it would be extremely expensive for the government to monitor for
such events. 137 If the parties know that the government will tax away their
unexpected gain, in whole or in part, they have an incentive to strike a deal
themselves and divide up the surplus. The parties are in a bilateral
monopoly, however, and negotiations are likely to be protracted. 138 Thus, all
the government accomplishes by trying to tax private windfalls is to force
the parties into an expensive bargaining game. Efficiency demands, to the
contrary, that legal rules help parties avoid such socially wasteful
transaction costs. Private windfalls thus are not efficient targets for capture.
Similarly, it is generally infeasible to capture finds: Taxing them away
will lead most finders simply to hide their good fortune or leave items lying
on the ground. 139 This, of course, frustrates the primary purpose of finders
law: promoting the return of goods to their true owners. In some sense,
then, we permit finders to retain their spoils when the true owner cannot be
determined as a reward for attempting to return them.
Capture is efficient for those rare private windfalls that are both (1) like
manna from heaven and do not come at the expense of anyone else, such as
the golden meteor discussed in the Introduction; and (2) detectable at low
cost. Under existing law, however, taxing away 100% of golden meteors
and similar windfalls amounts to a taking without just compensation. 140
Either the courts must reinterpret the word "property" in the Takings
Clause, or the people must amend it, for society to capture those rare

137. Pure private windfall cases like Wood and Shenvood surface rarely, undoubtedly
because it is only in exceptional cases that the party selling an item with surprise value ever hears
the good news. The purchaser-recipient of the pleasant surprise-has no incentive to publicize
the parties' mutual mistake and risk a lawsuit Every once in a while, however, a particularly
noteworthy contractual windfall becomes public knowledge. See, e.g., A 50¢ Frame That Just
Might Hold a Treasure, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 1995, at A29 (reporting how the purchaser of a
frame at a flea market found that it contained a draft of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem The
Village Blacksmith, appraised at approximately $7000).
138. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 68-69.
139. It is important to distinguish serendipitous finds from discoveries made by the
application of toil, skill, and enterprise. This is productive activity bearing only the most facile
resemblance to windfalls, and there is no good reason to subject income from such activities to
extraordinary taxation in the first place. See supra note 39.
While subject to no special tax, finds do count as ordinary income for federal income tax
purposes. See Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 812 (6th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding that $4467 in cash found in a used piano purchased by taxpayers
for $15 was taxable as ordinary income under the broad language of section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code). Like any tax, this creates some incentive to hide the find and to engage in less
finding in the first place, and thus is at odds with the purposes of finders law.
A contrary holding, that finds are not taxable income, would create powerful incentives for
taxpayers to recharacterize earned income as "lucky fmds" (for example, real estate brokers could
claim that they earned commissions serendipitously).
140. This assertion rests on the seemingly universal belief that the law, including the
Constitution, protects property obtained via windfalls just as much as it protects property earned
by effort or enterprise. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text
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private windfalls that come at the expense of no one else and are easy for
the state to detect.
The second reason society may not be indifferent between two
claimants to a private windfall is that transactions costs may make it
efficient to award the property to one side. As discussed in Section III.B
above, the state can save parties the cost of bargaining by setting a default
rule that most parties would select if they contemplated and addressed a
contractual windfall. As a first cut, sharing private windfalls seems the
efficient outcome. On the assumption that both parties are risk-averse, they
will prefer half-size windfalls with twice the probability to full-size
windfalls half as often. Put another way, if the parties went to the time and
expense to insert a contractual term to cover pleasant surprises, they would
likely call for splitting such windfalls. This formalizes Fried's case for a
default sharing rule in contract law: "Sharing applies where there are no
rights to respect. It is the principle that would apply if a group of us were to
land together on some new planet. It is peculiarly appropriate to filling the
gaps in agreements, to picking up after contractual accidents." 141
When valuation is difficult (costly), however, splitting the windfall may
not be feasible. Consider a slightly tweaked version of the facts in Brown v.
Voss. 142 The plaintiff purchased adjacent landlocked lots Band C from the
defendant, owner of lot A. The plaintiff planned to build on lot B and leave
C in its natural state, and so the defendant granted her an easement across
lot A for the benefit of lot B only. Then, to everyone's surprise, a local river
changed course and now runs much closer to all three properties. Because
of the lay of the land, the plaintiff can build a home commanding a river
view (and thus of significantly higher value) only if the house straddles lots
Band C.
Efficiency demands that the house be built in its highest-value location,
yet the plaintiffs easement benefits only lot B and hence a house standing
on both lots formally violates-" overburdens" -the easement. The court in
Brown admitted that a house straddling B and C technically overburdened
the easement, but it upheld the trial court's decision in the plaintiff
homeowner's favor as a valid exercise of discretion since the defendant had
not suffered the "substantial" harm generally necessary to support an
injunction. 143 Had the parties anticipated this contingency in their contract,

141. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
71 (1981) (footnote omitted). Fried makes the case for sharing losses as well as gains. There may
often be a stronger case, however, that in the case of losses one party or the other is the best risk
bearer and should therefore absorb the entire loss.
·
142. 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
143. See id. at 518.
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they might have adopted a sharing rule, but since valuation is so difficult
that option might have appeared unattractive ex ante. 144
When valuation is difficult, permitting the plaintiff to reap the entire
windfall may be sensible under an analog of the Coase Theorem.145 The
right to use the easement to benefit lot C has higher value in the plaintiff's
hands than in the defendant's. Instead of leaving the parties in a bilateral
monopoly or engaging in expensive valuation, it is efficient to award the
property right to the party valuing it more. This choice obviates the need for
socially wasteful negotiation or valuation. This approach is similar to
statutes giving owners of landlocked parcels rights of private
condemnation: They can obtain easements at market value regardless of any
higher value they attach to the right of way. 146
When there are three or more parties involved, courts and legislatures
have another option to achieve efficient ends: assigning property rights to
encourage competition (and thus efficient cost-pricing). Litigation over
utility easements, for example, often involves multiple holders of vaguely
specified rights. 147 The electricity company may have an easement over
each lot in a subdivision and, in turn, may have granted the telephone
company the right to use these easements for, say, "lines transmitting voice
and data." The cable television company then talks to both about buying
easements for its lines. The electricity company claims the right to control
use by virtue of its original easement; the phone company argues that cable
TV signals are "data" and hence it has the exclusive rights to permit (and
charge for) cable wire easements. The landowner may claim she granted the
utility the right only to run power lines and that she alone had the right to
permit use by the phone and cable companies.
Instead of assigning absolute property rights to the utility, the phone
company, or the landowners, a court or legislature could deem existing
property rights ambiguous and declare that all three have the right to sell an

144. The court could infer that the parties would have agreed to hire an impartial land
appraiser to estimate the incremental value of a house straddling the two lots, but such an
appraisal itself may be expensive.
145. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. I (1960).
146. Contrary to appearances, private condemnation is not a form of sharing. The condemner
pays a fixed value-the cost of her imposition-that is unrelated to the size of any windfall.
Similarly, the law of salvage limits awards to the reasonable cost of the rescue, which is
supposedly independent of the value of the cargo saved. See 3A BENEDICT ON AD:MIRALTY, supra
note 85, §§ 1-4.
In Brown, the likely cost of the additional easement would be zero, since the path already
existed and the plaintiff's technical overburdening was in reality no additional burden at all. See
Brown, 715 P.2d at 518.
147. See, e.g., CIR TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994); Centel Cable
Television v. Cook, 567 N.E.2d 1010 (Ohio 1991). See generally JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND!][ 12.07 (1995 & Supp. 1998)
(collecting cases).
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easement to the cable company. This eliminates a bilateral monopoly
problem and insures that the new user can buy at a competitive price. 148
IV. PuBLIC WINDFALLS
So far this Article has in the main presented only negative results. Part
II showed that due to the reporting problem-those experiencing good luck
will hide gains-there will be no private market for the "reverse insurance"
that risk-averse people likely desire. Part III first documented misuse of the
term "windfall." It then described reasons for avoiding contract
constructions that create windfalls and reasons that many windfalls cannot
be returned to their true owners. Finally, Part III demonstrated that even in
the remaining cases of private windfalls, capture is infeasible.
At a more general level, it is not surprising that common-law litigation
turns out to be a weak mechanism for the efficient taxation and
redistribution of windfalls. Commentators demonstrated that courts possess
quite limited mechanisms for implementing widespread redistribution149
and, more generally, labor at serious disadvantages compared to tax-based
regimes. 150 The previous Parts provided additional insight into the common
law's weakness as a means of redistributing windfalls. Reverse insurance,
like ordinary insurance, requires the combination (pooling) of a large group
of people. For ordinary insurance, the many make small contributions to
cover the losses of the few; for reverse insurance, the few share their
windfalls with the many. Private markets for ordinary insurance achieve
pooling via large insurance companies that combine thousands or even
millions of insurance buyers into a common pool. Common-law litigation
has no such hub and thus cannot construct a very effective pool of windfall
recipients.
Thus, those who question the wisdom of spreading risks via the legal
system set up a straw man when they demonstrate that the common law of
property, contracts, and torts is wholly inadequate to the task. Epstein, one
such critic, implicitly admits as much. After persuasively illustrating the
common law's shortcomings as a mechanism for risk-spreading, he moves
on to the more plausible mechanisms examined in this Part. "[P]rocedural
complications [with common law risk-spreading] thus drive us to a very
different, administrative solution, in which state officials have the power to

148. This assumes that the new use has no negative effect on existing uses.
149. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 570. Recall the difficulty courts have in cases involving
only three parties: Two parties fight over proceeds that properly belong to a third. See supra
Section ill.C.
150. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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tax the public at large in order to dispense needed payments to persons who
have suffered the requisite level of misfortune." 151
Epstein is extremely pessimistic about the efficacy of any such
"administrative solution" rooted in "the power to tax." His doubt stems in
part from his failure to treat bad luck and good luck as analytically distinct.
Since there is no market failure for ordinary insurance (against bad luck),
he seems to imply that the nonexis.tence of a market for reverse insurance
merely reflects consumers' preferences. For good luck, however, we have
seen that the market fails. Windfalls must be pooled, if at all, by the
government.
While the reporting problem and the cost of monitoring make capturing
private windfalls economically undesirable, neither stands in the way of
capturing public windfalls: Events affecting a broad swath of the population
are not secrets and the cost of monitoring for them is effectively zero. This
Part provides grounds for a moderately sanguine view of advanced
societies' opportunities to share public windfalls. It provides a series of
historical examples, from early American land law to insider trading,
showing that legislatures and executives have long used a variety of
mechanisms to assure that windfalls are shared among the citizenry. On rare
occasions, such sharing can be tailored closely to redistribute from winners
to losers, as illustrated in Section IV.A. The remainder of Part IV studies
cases of less finely tuned capture of windfalls. Section IV.B deals with
cases where the government extracts windfalls directly from their lucky
recipients and spreads the benefit over the populace. Section IV.C examines
structurally different but distributionally similar cases, where the
government makes sure it pays no more than cost when it needs something
from citizens, be it their property or their services as private attorneys
general. In all three contexts, developed bureaucracies and relatively
efficient information gathering and processing have greatly expanded
modern nations' ability to capture windfalls.
A. Tightly Coupled Windfall Capture

When independent participants involved in some enterprise know that
"dumb luck" will have a significant effect on who flourishes and who fails,
there is a strong incentive to strike some sort of risk-pooling agreement ex
ante. Risk-averse actors prefer predictable, middling income to chances for
reaping windfalls purchased with the risk of starvation. Those constructing
such insurance pools, of course, must make sure to preserve incentives for
effort and enterprise. This Section examines two historical examples of
151. Epstein, supra note 7, at 30. Epstein addresses bad luck, but he treats good and bad luck
symmetrically, overlooking the reporting problem.
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risk-management devices. Relatively primitive medieval governments were
simply incapable of windfall capture, yet their open-field system of
agriculture was an impressive tightly coupled insurance scheme. Over the
last hundred years, modem governments have experimented with measures
to make beneficiaries, instead of the public at large, pay landowners
economically harmed by zoning and land use controls. It is a testimonial to
the difficulty of such closely tailored windfall capture that these measures
have had, at best, mixed success.
The medieval open-field agriculture system was an ingenious
institution for pooling risk while maintaining incentives. 152 Productivity of
adjacent land varies significantly because of soil quality and localized
incidence of weather (for example, hail) and pests (vermin and microbes).
One way to minimize the risk of a family starving due to an unusually
unlucky growing season would have been communal farming: All families
work on all the village's arable land as a group and divide up the harvest
per capita. As catastrophic experiments with collective agriculture during
this century have demonstrated beyond peradventure, 153 however,
communal production creates irresistible incentives to free ride on the work
of others.
The open-field system granted each family property rights in randomly
distributed strips of land scattered throughout village lands. Thus, if hail
destroyed crops in the northern half of the fields, everyone suffered nearly
equal losses. Yet each family's remaining harvest, taken from their strips in
the unharmed southern fields, would depend directly on their own sweat
and toil. Giving each family one large block of land, instead of scattered
strips, would preserve incentives to work hard, but it would result in
windfalls for some and wipeouts for others. Dividing land holdings into
noncontiguous strips was a simple means to spread risks.
A set of modem statutes around the globe have attempted to make those
receiving windfalls due to government projects, land use, and regulation
pay off those harmed by the same measures. 154 Perhaps the most common
152. The following discussion draws heavily on Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1388-91 (1993), which contains numerous references to historical and economic
analyses of medieval open-field agriculture.
153. For a detailed summary of the tragedy resulting from Soviet attempts to collectivize
agriculture, see DMITRI VOLKOGONOV, STALIN: TRIUMPH AND 'TRAGEDY (Harold Shukman ed.
& trans., 1991). On China, see JONATHAN D. SPENCE, 'THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 583
( 1990) (describing the result of collectivization efforts in Mao's "Great Leap Forward" in the late
1950s as "famine on a gigantic scale, a famine that claimed 20 million lives or more between
1959 and 1962" ). For a discussion of the more recent failure of communal agriculture in Ethiopia,
see DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS, RED TEARS: WAR, FAMINE AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA 265-80
(1989). For additional citations documenting the almost universal failure of collectivized
agriculture, see Ellickson, supra note 152, at 1318 nn.4-7, 1335 nn.73 & 75.
154. For an extensive review of these laws and related policy discussions, see WINDFALLS
FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978). The editors use a subject-specific definition: "A windfall,. broadly
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example is rezoning. When a locality rezones a lot from, say, multifamily
dwellings to open space, the market value of the lot falls precipitously-a
wipeout. 155 Adjacent owners, conversely, receive a windfall in the form of a
quiet park or forest next door instead of noisy neighbors. The owner of the
rezoned lot, of course, likely has a takings claim and can sue the state for
just compensation. Many governments have searched for ways to reduce or
eliminate government payment by raising compensation for harmed
landowners from the benefited neighbors, instead of making all citizens pay
via the public fisc. 156
All measures taxing benefited landowners to fund those harmed by
governmental action share some of the flavor of the venerable mechanism
of special assessments, 157 where, for example, those serviced by a new road
or sewer line pay a one-time tax (that is, a special assessment) to cover the
cost of the project. Matters become more complex, however, when
government action harms as well as helps landowners. One early attempt to
circumvent takings challenges to zoning, pretty much explained by the
accurate if loquacious title "Zoning by Special Assessment Financed
Eminent Domain" (ZSAFED), called for special assessments against those
benefited to fund payments to those harmed. ZSAFEDs date back over a
hundred years; despite surviving constitutional challenges, they fell into
disfavor due to administrative expenses, especially in connection with the
difficulty of quantifying the size of the gains and losses to all affected
parcels. 158
More recent attempts to capture windfalls arising from governmental
action, called Special Capital and Real Estate Windfall Taxes (SCREWTs),
in effect give up the effort to tax property-value increases precisely due to
conceived, is an increase in property value caused by public action; a wipeout is an analogous
decrease." Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski, Introduction to WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra, at 1, 1.
155. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
156. See Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski, Executive Summary, in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at xxix, xl-xli.
157. Special assessments date back to at least 1287, when an ordinance required residents of
Sussex, England, to pay for shoring up a sea wall. The statute based assessments on the size of a
landowner's acreage that benefited from the sea wall. See EDWIN CANNAN, THE HISTORY OF
LoCAL RATES IN ENGLAND II (1912). By the 1890s, special assessments were common practice
in the United States. See TAX FOUND., SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND SERVICE CHARGES IN
MUNICIPAL FINANCE 8 (1970).
158. Apparently, homeowners on Gladstone Boulevard in Kansas City, Missouri, were the
first to prod a locality to adopt a ZSAFED in order to preserve the residential character of their
neighborhood. Thirty years later the statute survived a constitutional challenge. See In re Kansas
City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo. 1923) (upholding the constitutionality of a
ZSAFED against, inter alia, a challenge that the benefit for homeowners in one neighborhood was
not a public use for which the state could invoke its takings power). For additional history and
analysis of ZSAFEDs in both the United States and abroad, see Douglas G. Hagman, Bettennent
for Worsement: The English 1909 Act and Its Progeny, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note
154, at 491; and Donald G. Hagman, Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Zone
(ZSAFED), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at 517.
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governmental action; instead, they tax the increase in property values
between purchase and sale, much like a capital gains tax. A number of local
jurisdictions in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
employ taxes of this type. Though simpler than ZSAFEDs, SCREWTs are
still relatively complex; their usefulness for capturing windfalls at
reasonable costs is unclear, and thus so is their future. 159
The windfall capture mechanisms examined in the remainder of Part IV
inure to the benefit of the entire taxpaying public, either through greater tax
revenue (Section IV.B) or lower governmental expenditures (Section IV.C).
These two categories differ significantly in structure but not in substance.
Section IV.B examines the simpler case, in which someone receives a
windfall and the government captures it via taxation. Section IV.C
considers situations in which a citizen holds some property (or propertylike) right that surprisingly becomes of enhanced value to the public. While
the government could pay a high price and then turn around and assess a
windfall tax, it is administratively cheaper to establish rules allowing the
government to obtain the good at a lower price that does not impound any
windfall "premium." While the means differ, the end is the same in both
cases: spread the value of a windfall over all or most of the citizenry. In
some cases, spreading the windfall over the entire population is desirable:
for example, when selling government lands (in theory owned by the
citizenry per capita) that may have valuable minerals. In other cases, there
is a narrower group to whom society would like to channel the windfall
(e.g., oil consumers in the case of the Windfall Profit Tax on Oil after the
OPEC embargo), but such precision is administratively too costly.
B. State Extraction of Windfalls
1. American Soil and Its Riches
At its independence, the United States took title to millions of
uninhabited and unexplored acres. 160 For over 100 years, perhaps the single
most important function of the federal government was selling off these
vast holdings. While many characteristics contributing to the value of a
given section were widely known (for example, proximity to lakes, rivers,
roads, or towns; climate; danger from Native Americans), other important

159. See Madelyn Glickfield & Donald G. Hagman, Special Capital and Real Estate
lVindfalls Taxes (SCRElVTs), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at 437 & back leaf
tb1.20-l.
160. The individual states originally held title to Western lands, but, after considerable
haggling, each ceded its holdings to the federal government. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORYOFTHEAMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at225-38 (1940).
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attributes remained the secrets of a few men or the secrets of nature.
Surveyors, often the first and only Europeans to scout land before sale, had
unmatched knowledge about soil quality, for instance. At times, they
acquired much more valuable information, such as the location of a
saltlick161 or a mine. Everyone knew, however, that many mines (for coal,
lead, and precious metals) undoubtedly lay hidden on plain-looking
acreage.
In 1781, even before the United States had won its independence,
Pelatiah Webster voiced concern that valuable acres would fall into private
hands without payment of fair consideration. He proposed that
all saltlicks, and mines ... and all [valuable minerals] ... 'in which
the country greatly abounds,' may be reserved and sequestered for
public use: a great revenue may grow out of them: and it seems
unreasonable that those vast sources of wealth should be engrossed
and monopolized by any individuals .... [T]he vast profits issuing
from them should flow into the public treasury, and thereby inure to
the advantage of the whole community. 162
There are two potential worries here, and Webster may have
contemplated both. First, ·the United States as the selling principal needed to
guard against unfaithful agents colluding with buyers. A surveyor who
knew the location of a lead mine, for instance, could sell the information,
bid on the land himself, or enter into a secret partnership with other
buyers. 163 George Washington seemed concerned about such disloyalty
when he asked an associate about a potential safeguard:
Would there be any impropriety do you think sir, in reserving for
special sale, all Mines, minerals and Salt springs in the general
Grants of Land belonging to the United States. The Public, instead
of the few knowing ones, might in this case derive the benefits
which would result from the sale of them, without infringing any
rule of justice that occurs to me, or their own laws .... 164
Webster also seemed worried about windfalls: the existence of, for
example, a gold mine unknown to either the United States as seller or to
161. Streams of water with high salt content, saltlicks were a valuable resource for farmers
raising animals.
162. PELATIAH WEBSTER, POLffiCAL EsSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF MONEY,
PuBLIC FINANCES, AND OTHER SUBJECTS 497-98 (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank I 791).
163. Such breaches of faith by local officials were common. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY
OF PuBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 705 (1968); MALcOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE
BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PuBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837,
at 32-34, 197-99 (1968).
164. Letter from George Washington to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 14, 1784), in 28 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 9, 11 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938).
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buyers. The parties could have dealt with such contingencies by increasing
the price paid for land to reflect the likelihood of finding unexpected
wealth, but this would have been quite difficult. Estimating the odds of a
mine on government land, and its value, would involve great uncertainty.
Moreover, this approach seems unattractive to buyers interested in farming.
Assuming, as usual, that they are risk-averse, farmers buying farmland
would find even fairly priced "tickets" to play in a "mining lottery"
unattractive. The government thus would expect to find higher bidders
elsewhere, and one might expect to see it separate mineral rights from other
land rights.
In the first statutes governing land sales, the national government
pursued precisely such an approach. In 1785, the Continental Congress
reserved for the government "one-third part of all gold, silver, lead and
copper mines, to be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall
hereafter direct." 165 Congress did not invent this measure. Under the
common law of England, the Crown owned all gold and silver, and royal
land grants in the colonies continued this tradition in one form or another. 166
When locating minerals was largely serendipitous, as opposed to the result
of the significant investments utilized in modern times, letting mineral
wealth essentially fall into the lap of the purchaser of well-situated farm
acreage did amount to a windfall.
The King, and later the United States, may have ceded a portion of
mine output to landowners in order to induce them to search for valuable
minerals and to reduce the incentive to keep such fmds secret. The young
nation, however, simply lacked the resources to monitor effectively the acts
of thousands of landowners on the frontier and thus never could enforce the
rights it tried to reserve. Disloyal agents bought up the tracts themselves
rather than disclose the location of mines to the government. Squatters
mined parcels until ejected by bona fide purchasers. Mter a series of
attempts to enforce the nation's rights over mineral wealth on lands,
Congress by 1846 largely gave up on its efforts to reserve a portion of
mineral windfalls for the nation. 167

165. 10 JOURNALS OFTiiECONTINENTALCONGRESS 378 (May 20, 1785).
166. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF TiiE INSTITUTES OF TiiE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *577-78 (DavidS. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thome eds., Garland Publ'g 1979) (1642)
(explaining the King's claim based on the necessity of precious metals for coinage). Early grants
in Massachusetts colonies reserved to the Crown one-fifth of all gold and silver discovered. See
James Warren Springer, American Indians and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New
England, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HlST. 25, 32 (1986) (citing 1 RECORDS OF TiiE GOVERNOR AND
COMPANY OF TiiE MASSACHUSETIS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 4, 9 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed.,
Boston, William White 1853-1854)). Other grants hewed to English tradition and reserved all gold
and silver for the King. See ALBERT TANGEMAN VOLWll.ER, GEORGE CROGHAN AND TilE
WESTWARD MOVEMENT 1741-82, at 251 (1926) (discussing a 1769 grant in New York State to
George Croghan).
167. See GATES, supra note 163, at 700-07.
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2. Taxing Away Windfalls
The government had extremely limited means to capture windfalls
during the nation's first century. The rapid growth of the modem
bureaucratic state in the late 1800s and early 1900s, however, changed the
administrative landscape. Perhaps no mechanism played a greater role in
this growth, and the concomitant ability to capture windfalls, than the
establishment of a federal income tax. 168 With statutes, regulations,
personnel, and all the other implements of a modem revenue-collection
system in place, the United States by 1917 had the ability to tax perceived
windfalls directly.
The Subsections that follow first contrast the two major extraordinary
profits taxes imposed by the federal government since it has had the ability
to impose such levies: the excess profits taxes imposed during the two
world wars and the windfall profits tax imposed on oil producers in the
wake of OPEC's successful price hikes in the 1970s. The subsequent
Subsections then argue that progressive taxation, and the doctrine of
escheat, are forms of windfall capture.
a. Excess and Windfall Profits Taxation
1.

Excess Profits Taxes During the World Wars

Nobel Prize-winning economist John Hicks outlined two very different
ways for a nation to levy taxes on exceptional wartime profits:
A war profits tax is a tax on windfall profits; since there is very
little reason in equity for claiming that anyone has the right to such
profits in war-time, the special taxation of these profits can give
little justifiable cause for complaint. But as soon as any element of
the high profits principle is included, the tax becomes ... a general
profi ts tax .... 169

168. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, established the validity
of a federal tax on income. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Soon thereafter, a leading account
discussing the nation's ability to raise money for the war effort noted that "[w]e appreciate more
than ever before the great advantage of having developed the administrative machinery of !he
income tax." T.S. Adams, Federal Taxes upon Income and Excess Profits, 8 AM. EcON. REV. 18,
40 (Supp. 1918) (quoting the comments of ArlhurN. Young); see also ROBERTM. LAFOLLEITE,
WAR PROFITS TAX: IS IT DISLOYAL TO ADVOCATE TilE TAXATION OF WAR PROFITS AND
SURPLUS INCOMES? 3-32 (1917) (containing speeches before !he Senate on Sept. 1, 1917 and
Sept. 10, 1917).
169. JOHNR. HICKSET AL., THETAXATIONOFWAR WEALTII42 (1942) (emphases added).
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Hicks uses the term "war profits" to describe a carefully targeted windfall
profits tax (WPT), in contrast with a general tax on "high" profits whether
or not they arise due to wartime spending-an excess profits tax (EPT).
Both Britain and the United States assessed EPTs, not WPTs, during
the world wars. These choices may have some historical roots, 170 but they
appear to have been largely a product of expediency. As argued in this
Subsection, it is very difficult to construct a WPT narrowly targeting only
war profits. Unfortunately, EPTs are not good substitutes for WPTs. The
EPTs implemented during the world wars warped incentives and thus
created inefficiencies.
Though largely forgotten, EPTs funded a large portion of the United
States' expenditures during both world wars. 171 The tax was part and parcel
of the decision, often implicit, to leave most of the wartime economy in
private hands, on the belief that, during war as during peace, the market
would produce goods more efficiently than the state: "The case for some
utilization of economic incentive in war-time is ... based upon the practical
impossibility of bringing the whole of a nation's economic activities under
control-or at least under effective control." 172
Enterprises and their owners possessing goods and services in high
demand inevitably accrue war wealth. 173 Cases of spectacular profits
became public knowledge and caused outrage from the beginning of World
War I. One of the first and most infamous cases in Britain was a 400%
increase in the profits of Spillers & Bakers, a grain-trading firm, between
1913 and 1914. The firm apparently locked in low prewar prices for large
amounts of imported flour and sold at war-inflated prices. 174 The American
experience was similar though more extreme. Doubling of profits was

170. During the Civil War, the Confederate State of Georgia enacted a business profits tax,
with an exemption based on capital, that was similar in many ways to the world war EPTs. See
KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, INCOI\ffi TAXATION: METHODS AND REsULTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
212-14 (1910). Michigan classified railroads according to net earnings per mile and assessed an
EPT-like tax with rates depending on this measure. See HENRY CARTER ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF
FINANCE 466 (New York, Holt & Co. 1898) ..
171. During World War I, "[fjinancially, the excess profits tax was a huge success. It formed
the backbone of our war tax system •.•." KENNETH JAMES CURRAN, ExCESS PROFITS
TAXATION 189 (1943). By the end of the war, it accounted for 59% of the American
government's revenue. See id. at 136-37 & tbl.3. At its peak, the British EPT raised about 36% of
the government's revenue. See JOSIAH STAMP, TAXATION DURING TilE WAR 249 app.IV (1932).
During World War II, the EPT at its peak raised about 23% of federal government revenue. See
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNuAL REPORT OF TilE SECRETARY OF TilE TREASURY ON TilE STATE
OF TilE FINANCES 562-63 (1945) (noting that the EPT raised $5 billion out of a total revenue of
$22 billion in the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1944).
172. HICKSET AL., supra note 169, at4.
173. "The only effective way of preventing war wealth from arising is to rely upon the
compulsory method of mobilization rather than the voluntary method ...." ld. at 2.
174. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 39-40; see also id. at42 (stating that profits of the King's
Norton Metal Company rose 350% from 1913 to 1914).
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common, while a few firms experienced increases of a factor of ten or even
close to fifty .175
Sweden and Denmark imposed the first special profits tax during World
War I, in reaction to the spectacular profits of traders and shippers who, due
to the allied blockade of the North Sea, possessed the sole remaining trade
routes into Germany, through the Baltic Sea. 176 Once enacted, the EPT,
"[l]ike the Spanish influenza ... speedily infected all the belligerent
countries on both sides ...." 177 Britain and the United States first enacted
narrowly focused taxes on munitions makers, but they soon passed laws
assessing an EPT on all corporations. 178
Many leaders and economists believed that the EPT should survive the
war as an important source of public revenue. 179 Opponents of the EPT,
however, succeeded in repealing the tax after the war's end and prevented
reenactment until World War II. 180 History repeated itself in the early years
of World War II, however, as both the United States and Britain first
enacted special taxes on munitions makers 181 and followed with economywide EPTs. 182 Most recently, the United States relied on an EPT during the
Korean War. 183
Ordinary profit (that is, business income) taxes apply to all net income.
An EPT applies only to "excess" profits, but there is no obvious way to
defme excess profits. While statutes varied significantly in detail, all
defined excess profits in one of two basic ways. Some provisions defined

175. The profits of the American Agricultural Chemical Company and Standard Oil of New
York doubled between 1913 and 1916. DuPont's profits increased 14-fold over the same period,
while the American Zinc, Lead, and Smelting Company saw profits rise by a factor of 45. See LA
FOLLETIE, supra note 168,, at 27.
176. See PAOLO E. COLETTA, SEA POWER IN THE ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN IN
WORLD WAR I, at 25-28, 29 map (1989).
177. Carl C. Plehn, War Profits and Excess Profits Taxes, 10 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 285
(1920)
178. See CURRAN, supra note 171, at 8. The United States passed the Vinson-Trammel
excess profits tax on munitions manufacturers as Title ill of the Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No.
64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 780-82 (1916). In the ensuing years of World War I, Congress passed a
succession of more broadly based and more complex EPTs. See Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
64-377, tit. II, 39 Stat. 1000, 1000-02; War Expense Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, tit. II, 40 Stat. 300,
302-08 (1917); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, tit. II, 40 Stat. 1057, 1088-96 (1919).
179. In 1919, President Wilson advocated a permanent EPT as a way to "reach undue profits
without discouraging the enterprise and activity of our business men." 58 CONG. REc. 41-42
(1919).
180. President Roosevelt's New Deal included a very modest EPT in the National Industrial
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 216-17,48 Stat. 195,208-09 (1933). This measure, however,
was designed not to raise revenue, but rather to encourage businesses to assess fairly their capital
stock for a complementary tax on capital stock. See id. § 215, at 207-08.
181. The (second) Vinson-Trammel Act taxed naval contractors 100% of profits in excess of
the contract price. See Act of March 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-135, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 503,505.
182. The United States enacted an EPT during initial mobilization, before it had entered the
war. See Second Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-801, tit. II, 54 Stat. 974, 975-98.
183. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
137-44 (1985).
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any return on capital over a fixed percent as excess profits. 184 This is clearly
an economy-wide EPT that makes no attempt to target war windfalls. Other
provisions defined excess profits as net income in excess of prewar
levels. 185 Most American and British EPTs gave firms the choice of using
either method to determine the EPT they owed. 186
In the view of some politicians, identifying extraordinary war profits
was easy, and taxing them had no adverse impact on effort or enterprise.
" [P]recisely because the war profits which it is proposed to reach by
taxation ... are abnormal profits, ansmg from abnormal causes,
substantially all of them might be taken by the Government in taxation
without disturbing normal business conditions, providing only that all kinds
of business producing war profits are treated the same." 187 A prominent
economist went even further, justifying an EPT even during peacetime.
" [The EPT] represents, as it were, the share of the state in the
'supernormal' success of every business enterprise. It measures roughly the
value of the facilities, opportunities, and environment provided by the
community.... [T]he state and community stand as silent partners in every
business enterprise." 188
Most experts at the time, however, realized that defining a normal level
of profit for one firm, let alone for an entire economy, was difficult if not
impossible. 189 One serious problem was accounting for the varying riskiness
of enterprises. A foundational principle of modem finance theory,
undoubtedly known intuitively since the dawn of capitalism, is that those
184. America's first World War I EPT, Title ll of the Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64377, 39 Stat. 1000, 1000-02 (1917), taxed profits above eight percent of invested capital, plus
$5000, at an eight-percent rate.
185. Title II of the War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300, 302-08 (1917), added
an alternative definition of excess profits: those exceeding average profits in the three years
preceding the war.
186. By the end of World War I, both Britain and the United States offered taxpaying firms
such a choice. See session laws cited supra note 178; Plehn, supra note 177, at 287. Both nations
offered the same choice throughout World War II. Congress enacted the first World War ll EPT in
1940. See Second Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-801, tit. ll, 54 Stat. 974, 975-98 (1940).
Both definitions survived equal protection challenges despite disparate impacts resulting from
prewar profit fluctuations, varying definitions of invested capital across industries, and other
sources of seeming unfairness in application. See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S.
377 (1921).
187. LA FOLLETIE, supra note 168, at 16-17. For similar optimism about separating war
profit windfalls from fairly earned profits, see 54 CONG. REc. 2319 (statement of Rep. Dickinson)
(1917) (" [T]hose who reap large war profits in times of distress should help to bear the burdens of
Government, increased by reason of the very conditions that add to the wealth of those who
flourish and fatten on the misfortunes of the country.").
188. Adams, supra note 168, at 19-20 (1918). Commentators continue to define windfall
profits as equivalent to excess profits. See HAROLD S. SLOAN & ARNOLD J. ZURCHER,
DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 467 (5th ed. 1970) (defining a windfall profit as "[a] profit in excess
of that which can be considered normal").
189. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 41 (arguing that "the difficulty in determining what were
war profits [is] fundamental"); Plehn, supra note 177, at 285 (" [T]he line of demarcation between
'war profits' and other unusual profits proved exceedingly hard to draw.").
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taking greater risks demand greater rewards. 190 Economists realized that
defining excess profits as returns above a given percentage for all
businesses was inappropriate. "The burden must not apply with full rigor to
profits won at great hazard. Some crocks of cream appear to be richer than
they are." 191 One early advocate of the EPT admitted that failure to account
for varying risk was a fundamental flaw.
Everyone recognizes that the same rate of return which would be
fair to banks would be unfair to the men who make a business of
prospecting or 'wild-catting' for minerals and oil ....
. . . The percentage deduction should vary with the risk....
. . . The excess profits tax has grievously sinned in overtaxing
profits derived from the more hazardous and difficult industrial
undertakings. 192
This shortcoming led some to advocate the use of past profits to define a
baseline for excess wartime profits. 193 But using history to define "normal"
profits involves a host of difficulties as well. Many businesses became
especially risky during wartime and hence deserved higher profits. 194 Since
profits vary significantly from year to year, using a historical base for the
EPTs made taxes vary arbitrarily from firm to flrm. 195
Perhaps the greatest difficulty was making exceptions for fums
designed to serve wartime needs. British policymakers realized that they
had to make an exception for businesses that "had been carried on
continuously for a great many years in peace time, not with the expectation
or the hope, but on the possibility that one day in war time they might
recoup themselves for their loss." 196 This amounts to an implicit admission
that it was a mistake to assess EPTs against munitions manufacturersalways the first target. 197 For businesses whose planning even in part
reflected the possibility of war, high wartime profits are no windfall.
Nations leaving the means of production in private hands want some firms
to maintain capacity for wartime needs-and must be willing to reward
such firms when the nation needs their output.
190. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 129-212 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining in detail the theory and evidence
showing that returns are positively correlated with risk).
191. Robert Murray Haig, British Experience with Excess Profits Taxation, 10 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 12 (1920).
192. Thomas S. Adams, Should the Excess Profits Tax Be Repealed?, 35 Q.J. EcON. 363,
380, 390, 392 (1921).
193. See, e.g., OTTO H. KAHN, SOME COMMENTS ON WAR TAXATION 24 (1917).
194. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 182.
195. See Adams, supra note 192, at 388-89.
196. STAMP, supra note 171, at48-49.
197. See supra text accompanying note 178.
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So far I have examined only the tax base of the wartime EPTs. The
marginal rate applied to the various bases varied considerably, rising as
high as ninety percent. 198 Commentators derided the waste that inevitably
resulted from such high rates.199 The perverse economic incentives were
simple. "When the government took [eighty-six percent] of an excess
profit ... the tendency was to buy any article selling for £100 which had a
value to the taxpayer of £14 or more." 200 The tactics employed were diverse
and clever: charging low prices to earn customer goodwill, making
"[r]enovations and repairs ... on a lavish scale," advertising with
previously unseen intensity, hiring family members for nonexistent jobs,
and paying inordinate salaries.201 A prominent financier noted, long before
the development of the Laffer Curve, that high tax rates can lead to such
severe avoidance that a shrinking tax base more than offsets the higher rate
and leads to reduced government tax receipts. 202
Whatever base and rate lawmakers adopted, the bottom-line economic
question was the effect of a tax on incentives to work hard and take
calculated risks.
If the offer of higher incomes to certain people does succeed in
stimulating war production in those directions where it is most
needed, then the nation which secures this stimulus in return for a
draft on the future may have made a very good bargain. Higher
incomes which do not result in any such stimulus are, however,
likely to occur ... [and] their occurrence is one of the main

198. While under Title II of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,56 Stat 798,899936, the marginal tax rate on excess profits was 90%, a separate provision limited an enterprise's
total tax to 80% of net income. The 1934 Vinson-Trammel Act taxed 100% of naval contractor
profits. See supra note 181. Such a high tax rate "is beyond all question very dangerous indeed,"
HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 44, as the nation soon realized." As the [American] rearmament
program progressed, there developed throughout the country a belief that the severe restrictions
placed upon profits by the Vinson-Trammel Act were retarding plant expansion and production in
the defense industries." CURRAN, supra note 171, at 172. Congress repealed the Act when it
imposed the general wartime EPT in 1940.
199. See Haig, supra note 191, at 6 ("There was much evidence that the war tax ... had led
to extravagant and wasteful expenditure ... .");see also CURRAN, supra note 171, at 5 (noting
"[t]he tendency of an excess profits tax to lead to wasteful expenditures and lax methods in
industry").
200. Haig, supra note 191, at 9.
201. ld. at 7-9.
202. See KAHN, supra note 193, at 20. Kahn himself took no credit for this relationship,
which economist Arthur Laffer rediscovered to much fanfare in the late 1970s. See Arthur B.
Laffer, Statement Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee (May 20, 1977), reprinted in THE
ECONOMICS OF TIIE TAX REVOLT: A READER 75-79 (Arthur B. Laffer & Jan P. Seymour eds.,
1979). Kahn regarded the insight as ancient: "It is one of the oldest principles of taxation that an
excessive impost destroys its own productivity." ld. at 21.
For a comprehensive analysis and historical summary of the idea behind the Laffer Curve,
tracing it back at least to ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), see Don Fullerton, On
the Possibility of an Inverse Relationship Between Tax Rates and Government Revenue, 19 J.
PUB. EcON. 3 (1982).
.
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objections against the use of supply and demand as a means for the
mobilization of resources in wartime. 203
To take concrete examples, munitions experts undoubtedly were
awarded extraordinary income during World Wars I and II in order to
induce them to work hard and to lure additional bright minds into the field.
On the other hand, the owner of an existing oil field might reap pure rents
due to intense wartime demand. This Article defines such rents as a
windfall. Hicks concurred, noting that such rents comprised "the only part
of the war debt ... which does correspond to a genuinely reprehensible
form of war wealth." 204 While taxes on munitions experts were "dangerous
expedients so far as they checked the economic incentive to efficiency,"
taxes on those reaping economic rents were "useful expedients [insofar as]
they succeed[ed] in reducing the cost of obtaining [efficient wartime
production], and in distributing the economic burden of war in a more
equitable manner." 205
EPTs taxed marginal profits, the last incremental dollars earned, and
hence seriously undermined incentives for effort and enterprise that would
increase the amount of war material produced.206 Even advocates admitted
that the tax seemed "calculated to depress industry, to check enterprise at
its very inception." 207 Legislators and administrators soon became aware
that the EPT undermined the very incentives that justified leaving war
production in private hands and added a wide variety of measures to reward
new investment.208 These attempts to mitigate the disincentives inherent in
EPTs led to the extraordinary complexity emphasized by virtually every
commentator.209
203. HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 23.
204. ld. at 23-24.
205. Id. at 8. While there was significant worry about the outbreak of war, the actual outbreak
of hostilities in the fall of 1914 was still surprising, and thus it is far from clear that the likelihood
of war was capitalized into asset prices. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A
COMPLETE HISTORY 11, 13 (1994) (" [W]ar seemed unlikely in the spring and summer of
1914.... [T]he fact that almost every European Head of State was related by marriage to every
other ... created bonds that seemed unbreakable.").
206. See HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 43.
207. Adams, supra note 168, at 45 (quoting Edwin R.A. Seligman).
208. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-259, § 203, 55 Stat. 687, 702 (containing
special tax provisions for new plants useful only during wartime); CURRAN, supra note 171, at
181-82 (encouraging increased production by allowing new plant expenditures to count 125% in
defining invested capital); Plehn, supra note 177, at 287,292 (describing administrative measures
varying tax rates to address differences in risk across enterprises).
209. See, e.g., CURRAN, supra note 171, at 178 (stating that the EPT "proved next to
impossible for any one other than the tax expert to understand"); Adams, supra note 192, at 369
(describing enormous "resentment at [the EPT's] intricacy"). The Secretary of the Treasury
himself complained about the complexity of the EPT in an annual report after the war. See 1920
DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY ANN. REP. 30. Though similar perceptions are common today,
taxpayers in the nascent days of the income tax found it preposterous that officials and experts
often disagreed about key aspects of the EPT. See Adams, supra note 168, at 46.
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It is instructive to contrast the imposition of the EPT on industry with
the complete absence of any special tax on farmers. Policymakers quite
properly noted that "it was illogical to be urging [farmers] in every way to
put more land under cultivation and increase the food-supply, and at the
same time render them liable to special taxation if they did so." 210 The
obvious question, then, is why the same logic did not apply to industry.
It is clear that the wartime EPTs were inimical to incentives for extra
effort and enterprise. In theory, however, it is possible to construct a tax
that "aims at windfalls, the fruits of chance and luck, monopoly gains, war
profits and the like." 211 The key insight is to realize that many (though by
no means all) owners of capital and resources existing at the onset of
hostilities did indeed reap a windfall when wartime demand surprisingly
made their holdings more valuable. These rents were windfalls, "the fruits
of chance and luck, monopoly gains," and taxing them is efficient both as a
source of revenue and as a means of risk-spreading (again, as long as
transaction and administrative costs are not prohibitive). Special wartime
taxes should not apply, however, to investments in plants and discoveries of
resources made in anticipation of war or made after war begins. Thus,
farmers should have been assessed special taxes on acreage planted at the
onset of a war, but not on additional acres brought under cultivation. Such a
tax structure would not interfere with incentives to produce more; it would
merely tax windfall profits to existing levels of enterprise. Separating preand postwar investments and discoveries, however, would have been an
administrative nightmare.
There may have been important sociological and political reasons for
EPT taxation during wartime. "The excess profits tax has been pointed to
as an assurance that there would be no profiteering in urging all groups in
the economy to cooperate in the prosecution of the war." 212 With an entire
generation of men heading off to the front lines, "the public was in no
mood to tolerate a situation that promised extravagant profits to industry at
a time when selective service was imposing severe sacrifices upon hundreds
of thousands." 213 There was a widespread perception that the public simply
would not tolerate enormous profits while so many were sacrificing their
lives; in Britain, " '[t]he indignation of the country was brought to boilingpoint"' by reports of extraordinary profits of firms like Spillers &
Bakers.214 President Roosevelt was so sensitive to this public concern that in
210. STAMP, supra note 171, at 71.
211. Adams, supra note 192, at 367.
212. MAR.IONHAMILTONGILLIM, THEINCIDENCEOFEXCESSPROFITSTAXATION 55 (1945).
213. CURRAN, supra note 171, at 175.
214. STAMP, supra note 171, at 40. For a discussion of Spillers & Bakers's extraordinary
profits, see supra text accompanying note 174. Conspicuous consumption led to extremely high
personal income tax rates during the war. The British press bemoaned " 'the Asquith wedding of
1915, which was so awkward a stumbling block in the way of preachers of economy for many
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his first radio address after the outbreak ofWWII, long before Pearl Harbor,
he declared that " 'no American has the moral right to profiteer at the
expense either of his fellow-citizens or of the men, women, and children
who are living and dying in the midst of war in Europe,"' 215 and he later
swore that "not a single war millionaire would be permitted as a result of
the war disaster." 216 The EPfs may have played an important role in
obtaining organized labor's cooperation in working overtime to produce as
much as possible for the war effort. "It was stated that [an excess profits]
tax would be a most important factor in mollifying labour, for one of the
greatest causes of unfortunate trade disputes was the feeling of the men that
their masters were filling their pockets." 217 "'A profits tax would do more
to increase production than anything else could do.'" 218
While public policy usually does not concern itself with mollifying
envy, and standard economics does not model the effect of A's wealth on
B' s happiness,219 the world wars involved mass conscription, rationing, and
other extreme measures. Thus, politicians may have calculated rationally
that EPfs were necessary to hold together the social fabric. High
transaction and administrative costs may have made a theoretically more
attractive windfall profits tax infeasible. There may have been no choice
consistent "with both good morals and good economics, to prevent, as far
as possible, the enrichment of business and business men through the
calamity of war." 220 Thus, the EPfs may have been defensible as the best
alternative in an imperfect world.

ii. The Windfall Profit Tax on Oil
The Windfall Profit Tax on Oil, in contrast to the wartime EPfs, stands
as a relatively efficient tax on unearned windfalls. While ultimately caused
by the successful 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), the roots of the tax begin with economy-wide

months afterward,"' and similarly railed against a ball given by Lady Curzon in 1917 that was
"'beautifully done and extremely smart."' LA FOLLETTE, supra note 168, at 19 (citing The Loan
and the Moral, EcONOMIST, Mar. 3, 1917, at424).
215. CURRAN, supra note 171, at 174 (quoting Text of Address by the President, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 4, 1939, at 6).
216. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATIONINTHEUNITEDSTATES 263 (1954).
217. STAMP, supra note 171, at 51.
218. /d. at 147 (quoting Sir A. Markham, M.P.); see also Note, Mobilization for Defense, 54
HARV. L. REv. 278, 311 (1940) (stating that Congress passed the EPT on the eve of WWll in
large part to protect the morale of laborers, consumers, and draftees from high wartime profits by
industry).
219. For a comprehensive overview of the limited economic literature examining models in
which people's welfare depends on the welfare of others, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALEL.J. 1 (1992).
220. KAHN, supra note 193, at 22.
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wage and price controls imposed by executive order in 1971.221 While most
controls soon ended, the government continued to regulate oil prices in the
wake of OPEC's successful cartelization in 1973 and thereafter. For th~
duration of the 1970s, domestic petroleum prices remained below world
levels by governmental fiat.222
Artificially low domestic petroleum prices only exacerbated the energy
cns1s by encouraging consumption and discouraging domestic
exploration.223 These adverse incentives created a growing chorus for price
deregulation, and the government eventually responded.
In 1979, President Carter announced a program to remove price
controls from domestic oil by ... 1981. By eliminating price
controls, the President sought to encourage exploration for new oil
and to increase production of old oil from marginally economic
operations. He recognized, however, that deregulating oil prices
would produce substantial gains (referred to as "windfalls") for
some producers. The price of oil on the world market had risen
markedly, and it was anticipated that deregulating the price of oil
already in production would allow domestic producers to receive
prices far in excess of their initial estimates. Accordingly, the

221. See Dennis B. Drapkin & Philip K. Verleger, Jr., The Windfall Profit Tax: Origins,
Development, Implications, 22 B.C. L. REV. 631, 639 (1981).
222. For a more detailed history of the Wmdfall Profit Tax on Oil, see id. The lynchpin
regulatory measure to deal with the huge disparity between domestic and world market oil prices
created by the price freeze on petroleum was the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756 (repealed 1975). This Act "established a mechanism for allocating the
benefits of lower-cost price-controlled crude oil equitably throughout the country-not by
physically allocating oil, but by a system of cash transfers among the refiners based upon their
relative access to such oil." Texaco v. Department of Energy, 795 F.2d 1021, 1023 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1986). For a summary and analysis of the Act, see Note, National Energy Goals and
FEA 's Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program, 61 VA. L. REV. 903 (1975).
223. Price controls are one way to capture windfalls-indeed, they are more precise than
general taxation in redistributing gains from lucky winners to losers. As experience with oil price
controls showed, however, the misallocative effects of price controls are significant
To highlight these misallocations, consider another context giving rise to frequent
complaints of \vindfalls: hardware stores charging high prices for everything from flashlights to
shovels in the wake of a natural disaster such as a hurricane. If the store owner cannot raise prices
in the short run (before additional supplies can arrive), then someone may wander in and buy the
last flashlight to use as a nightlight for a mildly scared child, while the next person to rush in may
need one to search for survivors in a collapsed building. A higher price signals less needy users to
forgo consumption in favor of those in greater need. Contrary to popular belief, then, raising
prices in the wake of a disaster is not price-gouging-indeed, it may save lives. In the long run, of
course, we rely on higher prices to encourage greater production of flashlights (eventually driving
price back down to cost). If the natural disaster were truly an unprecedented surprise, and if it
were administratively feasible, the state might enact a windfall profits tax on hardware stores after
the fact Price regulation, however, is a foolhardy substitute.
These observations apply with equal force to one popular form of price regulation: rent
control. While temporary, surprise housing shortages make the strongest economic case for
barring landlords from raising rents, see ANTIIONY DOWNS, REsiDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS: AN
EVALUATION 1-2 (1988), such regulations mean, for example, that some fantilies will retain
excessive space, while others in great need may have to look far afield.
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President proposed that Congress place an excise tax on the
additional revenue resulting from decontrol.224
The Court properly labeled the measure an excise (sales) tax; in spite of its
title, the Act did not (at least directly) tax profits. 225 The Windfall Profit Tax
on Oil (WPTO) taxed producers on a percentage of the difference between
the market price of each barrel they sold and some base price defined in the
statute. This avoided the difficulty of defining the "normal" profits of oil
producers, a problem that, as outlined above, plagued the wartime EPTs.226
The definition of base prices and the varying percentage tax rates were
designed to create incentives for producers to explore for new domestic
sources of oil. Generally speaking, oil from older wells (those predating the
OPEC embargo) had both a lower base price (and so a greater portion of the
price was taxable) and higher tax rate (up to seventy percent). The statute
also contained a variety ·o f complicated exceptions and exemptions for oil
that was expensive to find and extract.
The Act was explicitly "designed to impose relatively high tax rates
where production cannot be expected to respond very much to further
increases in price and relatively low tax rates on oil whose production is
likely to be responsive to price." 227 The Act, then, aimed to tax most
heavily oil stocks discovered before the surprising OPEC embargo, while
taxing more recent and future discoveries less heavily or not at all. This is
precisely analogous to the efficient (though perhaps infeasible) alternative
to the wartime EPTs discussed earlier.228 The WPTO targeted windfalls
accruing to those lucky enough to be sitting on large stocks of oil when
OPEC surprised everyone by raising the world market price of oil
dramatically during the 1970s.229 As discussed in Part II, the windfall gains
of domestic producers charging OPEC-inflated prices were both an efficient

224. United States v. Ptasynski,, 462 U.S. 74, 76 (1983) (holding that the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980 did not violate the Constitution's Uniformity Clause, see U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 8, cl. I) (internal citations omitted).
225. See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229-308.
To the extent that the incidence of the tax fell on producers (that is, insofar as they could not shift
the tax onto their customers), as primarily appears to have been the case, the tax ultimately did
reduce profits instead of raising prices.
226. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
227. H.R. REP. No. 96-304, at 7 (1979), cited in Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 77; see also S. REP.
No. 96-394, at 6 (1979). "It is easy to see why a windfall profits tax on oil, for example, might be
best applied to oil already extracted, with future oil exempted." Levmore, supra note 12, at 273
n.l6.
228. See supra text accompanying note 211.
229. An external cartel benefits domestic producers in ways similar to a tariff: A cartel
maintains an artificially high price worldwide, while a tariff maintains an artificially high price
domestically. Economists have long argued that industries benefiting from tariffs (if there must be
tariffs) should pay some sort of windfall profits tax. See, e.g., CURRAN, supra note 171, at 3.
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source of tax revenue and a desirable form of sharing risk with a population
facing higher energy prices.230
On the plausible assumption that nobody foresaw that OPEC would try
to limit worldwide oil production, let alone succeed,231 the WPTO taxed
gains nobody expected. By limiting the levy to existing stocks, the
government had no need to face the difficulty of adjusting the tax for the
riskiness of the different enterprises. As windfalls, the gains of domestic
producers due to OPEC's success were all risklessly obtained.
Although the WPTO was free of many difficulties that faced the
wartime EPTs, it was not perfect. Because base prices did not reflect realworld costs precisely, experts estimate that the tax did discourage a modest
amount of cost-effective domestic production.232 And while it seemed a less
ambitious tax than the wartime EPTs, governing previously discovered oil
rather than present and future production of, and investment in, virtually
everything, one government study declared that the WPTO was "perhaps
the largest and most complex tax ever levied on a U.S. industry." 233
Estimates put the administrative costs of the WPTO at $115 million a
year. 234
Despite these imperfections, in the main the WPTO performed
admirably. Economists seem united in believing that, given a world price
for (competing) oil that domestic producers could not affect, the producers

230. It is important to note that, to the extent that all citizens own a diversified portfolio of
stocks, they would to some extent share in many windfalls such as that experienced by oil
producers in the wake of OPEC. What people lost at the gas pump, they would gain back in their
mutual funds and pension plans. Diversified investing, however, is unlikely to make windfalls a
wash. The windfall may occur in an industry largely in private hands, concentrating the gain in
relatively few hands. This was the case with the oil industry in the 1970s and 1980s, when
independents produced roughly half the nation's annual oil output. See William P. Streng & Mark
W. Romefelt, Structure of the Windfall Profits Tax, in PRACTICING LAW INST., WINDFALL
PROFITS TAX 11, 17-18 (William P. Streng ed., 1980). In addition, of course, wealth is not
perfectly distributed. The wealthy own stocks disproportionate to their numbers; relying on
individual portfolios to spread windfalls is thus regressive.
231. The standard assumption in economics is that price-fixing cartels are unstable, since, in
the absence of some enforcement mechanism, each supplier has an incentive to produce and sell
more, reducing prices. See NICHOLSON, supra note 15, at 449. OPEC did eventually succumb to
this "law" of economics, but only after a number of years, during which the cartel soaked billions
of dollars from the U.S. economy. See Salvatore Lazzari, Should the Windfall Profits Tax Be
Reinstated?, 48 TAX NOTES 1695 (1990).
232. "Over its eight-year life span, the windfall profits tax reduced domestic oil production
by between three and six percent, depending on the price elasticity of oil supply." Lazzari, supra
note 231, at 1695. The main source of disincentives were base prices that discouraged additional
development of existing oil fields. See Impact of Windfall Profits Tax Repeal on U.S. Production
Outlined in DOE Study, PLATI'S OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 19, 1987, at 6.
233. GAO, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980
(1984), quoted in Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1695.
234. It cost the federal government $15 million per year to administer the tax and cost private
industry $100 million a year to comply. See Oil Producers Win in Windfall Profits Tax Repeal,
UPI, Apr. 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Librruy, WIRES File.
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were unable to shift the tax onto consumers.235 Hence, the WPTO hit its
target. The windfall captured by the tax was huge-roughly $44 billion.236
This was not the entire windfall, but it was close: " [T]he tax recouped
about three-fourths of the windfalls that accrued to the U.S. oil industry." 237
At the appropriate moment, the tax died a natural death. By 1986, OPEC's
price-fixing regime began to fall apart. Market prices declined below the
base prices of the WPTO and thus producers owed no taxes. Congress
repealed the tax in 1988.238 Given the effectiveness of the WPTO, some
politicians have called for its reinstatement if and when the OPEC cartel
again effectively limits production and raises prices. When OPEC did just
that in the summer of 1990, for instance, one congressman declared that
" [w]indfall profits generated by ... price gouging at the expense of
consumers are intolerable and should be taxed." 239
The windfall justification for special taxation, however, only works
once. The world oil markets did seem largely surprised by OPEC's
successful cartelization in 1973. Few if any investment and exploration
decisions contemplated skyrocketing oil prices. Since the first oil shock,
however, OPEC has remained a fundamental source of risk in the oil
market. 240 Thus, while a successful OPEC may indeed boost the profits of
domestic oil producers, "just as sure, the industry might suffer windfall
losses when OPEC decides to help drive oil prices downwards, as happened
in 1986." 241 OPEC is now part of the oil market landscape, and it is
positively desirable that oil producers weigh the cartel's effects in their
exploration and investment decisions. For instance, post-OPEC, it may well

235. For a conventional static analysis showing that producers, not consumers, paid the
WPTO, see Stephen L. McDonald, The Incidence and Effects of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 331, 336-39 (1981). There followed between McDonald and Dale
Lehman a rather involved debate over the relative merits of this simple static model and a more
complex dynamic exhaustible resource model of the oil market. See Dale E. Lehman, Reader
Response, A Reexamination of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 683
(1981); Stephen L. McDonald, Reader Response, The Incidence and Effects of the Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax: A Reply to Lehman, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 690 (replying to Lehman); Dale
E. Lehman, Reader Response, 22 NAT. REsOURCES J. 275 (1982) (offering a rejoinder to
McDonald); Stephen L. McDonald, Reader Response, 22 NAT. REsOURCES J. 277 (1982)
(providing a riposte to Lehman).
236. The Congressional Research Service found that, over it!. lifetime, the tax raised
$77.7 billion in gross revenue (roughly $126 billion in current dollars) but only $43.7 billion in
net revenue (roughly $71.7 billion in current dollars), since producers could deduct WPTO
payments on their regular income tax returns. See Oil Producers Win in Windfall Profits Tax
Repeal, supra note 234. Current dollar calculations are based on the Consumer Price Index for All
Consumer Goods, seasonally adjusted, U.S. average, for all items, Bureau of Labor Statistics
series I.D. no. CUSROOOOSAO, available at http://www.bls.gov.
237. Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1695.
238. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1941, 102
Stat. 1107, 1322-24.
239. Silvio 0. Conte, ... Or Tax Excess Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1990, at A23.
240. See Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1696.
241. Id.
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be rational for domestic producers to look for oil that would cost, for
example, $75 a barrel to extract, even though the market price has never
exceeded $40 a barrel, and has, for the most part, fluctuated between $10
and $25 for the last decade.242 Such expensive oil might become attractive if
a reinvigorated OPEC managed to drive the price of oil above $100 a
barrel. Companies will not undertake such socially desirable exploration,
however, if the government stands ready to tax away the profits that only
foresight made possible. Windfall taxation makes sense only when gains
are due to true surprises, and events are usually surprises only the first time
market participants encounter them.243
The lesson is that windfall taxation should be imposed judiciously, as
true surprises are uncommon and by definition are not recurring events.
Britain's Labour government apparently has yet to learn this lesson. It
recently imposed a windfall profits tax on privatized utilities that made
record profits after the previous Tory government sold them to investors.244
Advocates did not point to a surprise that justified the tax; it seems that
either the government charged too little for the utilities when it sold them,245
or that regulators authorized excessive rate increases. The only surprise in
this case was the decision to impose a tax, and even that has come back to
haunt the government. When officials began the process of privatizing
railways, before the imposition of the windfall tax on utilities,
municipalities warned "that a windfall tax on water and electricity would
undermine the prospects for future privatisations." 246 Bidders will reduce
their offers to reflect (discounted) expected future windfall profits taxes. 247
The folly of the utility tax led some commentators to issue overly broad
condemnations of all windfall taxation. For instance, the claim that,
"[s]ince they are applied retrospectively, windfall taxes are inherently
242 See WTI Crude Monthly Averages (visited March 1, 1999) <http://www.wen.co.za/
wen/charts/oillcomawt.htm>.
243. In theory, a \vindfall tax on domestic oil discovered before 1973 but still in the ground
would be sensible. After 25 years, a large portion of domestic reserves consists of later
discoveries. As time goes on, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine which fields and what
percent of each field were discovered before 1973.
244. See Michael Prescott, Power Finns Face £2.5 Bn. Windfall Tax, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Sept 24, 1995 (discussing the political clamor for the tax); U.K. Utilities Hit by
"Windfall" Taxation Plan, On.. & GAS J., July 14, 1997, at 27 (discussing enactment of the tax by
the new Labour government).
245. One official drew the following analogy: "If you sell a house and three years later you
regret the price you sold you have no right to say you should change the terms of the contract."
Peter Rodgers, City Antipathy Fuelled by Fear and Loathing, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept
27, 1995, at 2 (quoting Adair Turner).
246. Id.
247. The government may fool them once, but investors are likely to catch on to patterns of
governmental behavior that affect returns and capitalize them into prices. Thus, the government
cannot rely on surprise as a long-term policy tool. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott,
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. EcON. 473 (1977);
R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REv. EcON. STUD.
165 (1955-1956).
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unfair," 248 is untenable. As discussed in Part II, the government can put the
world on notice that when it detects unearned rents, it will tax them. While
it is generally true that, "if people come to believe that when they make
money the state may arbitrarily snatch a large part of it, they will not work
as hard," 249 windfalls by definition are not the fruits of effort or enterprise.
Thus, ta'{ing them creates no disincentive effects.250
b. Progressive Income Tax

Windfall profit taxation need not focus on one product or industry.
Comparing the celebrity status and huge incomes commanded by some
Olympic gold medalists with the return to anonymity suffered by other
world-class athletes, one commentator argues that luck often plays a
significant role in personal income: " [W]hen it comes to income, skill and
hard work seem to play only a moderate role." 251 While it seems unlikely
that income earned by a minimum-wage manual laborer is due to any sort
of windfall, Olympic athletes, business executives, and others earn much
more than competitors with similar skills and dedication, and the difference
may be due to luck. To the extent this is true, then "even from a standpoint
of efficiency (much less equity), a progressive tax may not be so bad after
all." 252
The role of luck in personal income, however, is much less clear than
the role of luck in specific events, such as OPEC's effect on the oil market.
It is difficult to determine the effect of a steeply progressive tax on effort
and enterprise, but the disincentives may be significant.253 And reward
mechanisms that give rise to huge income discrepancies based on
seemingly small differences in performance may be rational means to
induce maximal effort from a pool of employees. The theory of
tournaments suggests that corporations pay CEOs huge salaries to induce
extraordinary effort from scores of senior vice presidents hoping to be the

248. Britain: Chasing Windfalls: Taxation, EcONOMIST, June 14-20, 1997, at 61.
249. Id.
250. Despite its absolutist tone, the Economist editorial admits that banks earned "genuine
windfalls" when the government tightened monetary policy in 1980 and thus they defend a
windfall profits tax on those gains. See id. They distinguish this episode from the utilities tax by
noting that "the circumstances appeared unusual" for the banks, but not for the utilities. /d. This
simply may be another way of saying that the banks experienced higher profits due to a complete
surprise (and hence received a windfall), while the utilities earned their higher profits by effort
and enterprise (and hence, under this Article's definition of the term, did not receive a windfall).
See id.
251. Steuerle, supra note 11, at 1197.
252. Id. at 1198.
253. See Jerry A. Hausman, Labor Supply, in HOW TAXES AFFECT EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27
(Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981); Jerry A. Hausman & James M. Poterba,
Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 101 (1987).
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next occupant of the top perch.254 Thus, efficiency considerations weigh
both for and against progressive taxation: Such taxes undoubtedly capture
some lucky windfalls, but also create disincentives and hence deadweight
losses. More controversial fairness arguments may be necessary to tip the
scale in favor of progressive taxation.
c. Intestacy and Escheat

One of the earliest uses of the term windfall was to describe receipts of
inheritance, and commentators continue to so view the gains of
beneficiaries under wills. 255 While an inheritance is often (though not
always) unearned, the proper focus of an efficiency analysis is on the
granting decedent, not the grantees. People are under no obligation to die
with assets; they can annuitize their net wealth at some advanced age and
thus ensure they leave nothing at death. Yet most choose to leave estates
large relative to their average incomes and to draft wills directing every
detail of the distribution of all of this wealth upon their deaths. This
behavior indicates that making gifts upon death has great utility to most
people. Taxing away bequests would cause devisers to alter their behavior
and leave less wealth via wills. People might work less hard, which is often
undesirable from a societal point of view. They would likely engage in
other behavior generally thought undesirable, such as consuming instead of
saving or making charitable donations.
When there is no will-an instance of intestacy-there are fairly strong
grounds to presume a certain indifference on the part of the deceased. Most
states, however, do not expropriate the estate when blood relations survive
the intestate decedent,256 presumably under the theory that almost everyone
means to leave their worldly possessions to such relatives and the absence
of a will is a mere oversight. Thus, the law, as it so often does, implies
likely default provisions where a decedent neglects to make a will.
If a decedent has no living relations, the government effectively taxes
the estate at 100% under the doctrine of escheat. Taxing wealth that the
owner basically abandoned at death creates little, if any, disincentive for the
living-if they are working hard to provide someone with an inheritance,
254. The seminal work on tournaments as compensation systems is Edward P. Lazear &
Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcON. 841
(1981). The seemingly inordinate rewards garnered by Olympic gold medalists compared to all
other competitors may play the same role, motivating all contestants to practice harder and longer,
and thereby producing a better competition in general. Steuerle seems to contemplate this
possibility when he admits that "the potential of large rewards may compel some to work harder
than ever." Steuerle, supra note 11, at 1197.
255. See supra note 2 (citing use by Erasmus in Apophthegmes). For a similar modem-era
characterization, see Plehn, supra note 177, at 283 ("Inheritance may be regarded as something
unexpected and of the nature of a windfall ...." ).
256. SeeWILLIAMM.MCGOVERN,JR.EfAL., WILLS, TRUSTSANDEsTATES 17-18(1988).
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they know that they need only write a will. Thus, intestate estates form an
attractive target for windfall taxation, and the modem law of escheat has a
long pedigree. Adam Smith listed a series of intestacy taxes,257 and
Bentham advocated a 100% tax in cases of intestacy where there were no
close surviving relatives. 258 Bentham's position foreshadowed a trend
toward curtailing windfalls for distant "laughing heirs," who receive
surprise inheritances from, for example, fifth cousins they never even knew
existed. The Uniform Probate Code and a growing number of states look
only as far as cousins (and their issue) when they distribute intestate
estates.259
While this expansion of escheat seems efficient, other recent
innovations of the doctrine are questionable. For instance, section 2(a)(1) of
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act extends escheat to unredeemed
travelers checks and a host of modem fmancial devices, such as unclaimed
insurance proceeds, utility deposits, etc.260 At first blush, it might appear
that unredeemed travelers checks are a windfall to issuers, but in a
competitive market they will have to pass on this saving to purchasers. This
market solution spreads the risk of forgetting about travelers checks over
the subgroup of consumers who purchase travelers checks: Returning the
windfall to those who create it, instead of the entire population, reduces
costs, and thus encourages the use of travelers checks. This is analogous to
returning lost goods to their true owners.

3. Insider Trading
In contrast to the time-honored use of escheat to capture hereditary
windfalls, the laws against insider trading are a recent development.261 That
insider trading was legal at common law is one factor cited to support
arguments that the practice is efficient.262 Yet just as assessing a windfall
profits tax would have been administratively impossible before nations
257. See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO TilE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TilE WEALTI:I OF
NATIONS 386-87 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago 1976) (1775-1776).
258. See 1 JEREMY BENTI:IAM'S EcONOMIC WRITINGS 283 (W. Stark ed., 1952).
259. See UNIF. PROBA1E CODE§ 2-103 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 1 (1998) (adopted in 14
states). At least three other states that have not adopted the Code have nonetheless followed its
lead and have limited the remoteness of relatives who take in cases of intestacy. See KAN. STAT.
ANN.§ 59-509 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.§ 112.017 (1997); WASH REV. CODE ANN.§ 11.04.015
(West 1998).
260. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT § 2(a)(1) (amended 1995), 8B U.L.A. 89 (Supp.
1998).
261. The United States had no federal securities laws until Congress enacted the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78lll (1994). The Securities and Exchange Commission did not promulgate Rule
lOb-5, the provision used to police insider trading, until1948. See 17 C.P.R. 240.10b-5 (1998).
262. See Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Inve~tment Analysts: An Economic Analysis
ofDirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127, 135 (1984).
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possessed extensive revenue collection apparatus, so too regulating insider
trading would have been extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, before
the advent of extensive securities market regulation. Under the common
view, insider trading can result in unearned windfalls, and hence regulation
is clearly desirable.263 To the uninitiated, then, the assertion that insider
trading is a desirable, efficient activity may seem fatuous. Yet serious
scholarship offers two grounds for returning to the common-law rule
allowing insider trading.
The first contention is that insider trading is an efficient form of
executive compensation.264 Executives may try to free ride on each others'
efforts; to the extent that it is difficult to separate out individual
contributions to a company's success, there may be insufficient incentives
for effort and enterprise. One way to reward producers of n~w ideas is to
permit insider trading: " [T]he manager can immediately 'renegotiate' his
compensation package by purchasing shares .... [l]nsider trading is the
only compensation scheme that allows immediate and costless renegotiation
whenever managers believe that they have the opportunity to develop
valuable information." 265
Ross raises a powerful objection to insider trading as a form of
executive compensation: Shareholders will have little, if any, control over
the size of insider trading profits and thus the agents (instead of the
principal) set their own wages. Thus, this form of compensation invites
executives to appropriate large rents without monitoring by other corporate
officials, shareholders, or the market.266 And the fact that shareholders and
potential shareholders might have a rough idea of the level of insider
trading and discount the price they are willing to pay for shares does not
justify the practice: A known level of criminal embezzlement would have
the same effect yet is clearly undesirable.
In addition to citing the common-law rule permitting insider trading in
support of the practice's efficiency, Fischel notes that during this period of
legality firms did not enact charter provisions barring insider trading by

263. This Subsection addresses the more difficult case of insider trading on positive
information likely to increase share prices. Rules against insider trading on negative information
are universally endorsed: Manufacturing bad news is much easier than manufacturing good news,
and if corporate executives could make money by trading in advance of bad news, the perverse
incentives would be overwhelming.
264. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TilE STOCK MARKET 131-45 (1966);
Fischel, supra note 262, at 132. This justification applies only to "classic" insider tradingtrading by executives in the shares of their employer. It cannot justify insider trading by, for
example, printers, see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), or by lawyers representing
an acquirer who trade in shares of the target, see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
265. Fischel, supra note 262, at 132.
266. See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of
Modem Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 184
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979).
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their own executives.267 This he takes as further evidence of the efficiency
of insider trading. By the same token, however, it is possible for firms today
to simulate insider trading as a form of executive compensation. Employers
could stand ready to write any and all call options requested by executives,
giving them the right to buy however many shares desired, at some price
above the stock's current market price, lasting for however long the
executives think it will take for some new idea to translate into a higher
stock price. If necessary, companies could avoid securities regulation of
these transactions by making the mechanism entirely derivative: Option
purchases could be made as mere accounting entries, and all settlements
could be paid in cash instead of shares. If insider trading is indeed an
efficient form of compensation, one would expect to observe such schemes
often; yet I have uncovered not a single reference to such a contract in the
extensive literature on executive compensation.
The second argument used to defend insider trading is that it causes
stock prices to reflect all available information, instead of just public
information, and hence leads to more accurate and efficient pricing of
shares?63 It is not at all clear, however, that personal trading by one or a few
parties trying to remain anonymous will move the market. If everyone else
in the market believes that the risk/reward profile of a company has not
changed, then any temporary upward pressure on its share price should
bring additional shares to market since the price now looks "too high"
given public information about the company, which by assumption has not
changed.269 And even if insider trading does move the market, there is a
simpler objection: It seems just as easy to move the market even faster by
requiring full disclosure before insiders may trade?70
Thus, it is doubtful that insider trading is beneficial, either as a form of
executive compensation or as a method to factor all information into stock
prices. The more difficult question is: In the vast, anonymous stock market,
who is harmed by insider trading? As noted previously, to the extent market
participants have a rough sense of the level of insider trading, they will
discount the price they pay for shares. Thus, in general, insider trading does
not affect returns, but it does make it more expensive for firms to raise
equity capital. A few definite victims are identifiable. First, those who trade
frequently without inside information will, over the run of transactions,

267. See Fischel, supra note 262, at 135.
268. See id. at 14042.
269. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakrnan, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10
VA. L. REv. 549, 629-34 (1984). This argument does not hold if the market knows that insiders,
or others likely to possess superior information, such as arbitrageurs warehousing shares, are
trading; such trades amount to new information that will lead to a permanently higher price.
270. See id. at 632; Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988).
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accumulate losses when they trade with better-informed parties. 271 Second,
somewhat paradoxically, non-insiders with comparatively good information
also lose out to insiders. 272 More generally, anyone unlucky enough to trade
when insiders are buying up shares based on nonpublic information may be
characterized as a victim of insider trading. 273
While none of these victims, taken alone, seems particularly
sympathetic, thinking in terms of windfalls provides a more powerful
argument for strictures against insider trading. If insider trading is legal, a
few insiders receive large, unearned windfalls, 274 while large numbers of
anonymous investors end up modestly poorer. From a sufficiently remote
ex ante perspective, nobody knows who is going to be lucky enough to
stumble across inside information, and thus this reward structure looks like
a lottery that risk-averse investors will find unattractive. Forbidding insider
trading spreads gains more broadly and hence is yet another form of reverse
insurance. In addition, government recoupment of insider trading profitswindfalls-by civil and criminal prosecutions is an efficient way to raise
revenue.

C. State Paying Minimum Price Necessary To Induce Desired Behavior
The previous Section considered scenarios in which individuals
received windfalls and the state then captured the gain. This Section
examines formally distinct, though substantively similar, situations where
individuals possess items that are of special value to society or are in a good
position to take some action that benefits society. Instead of capturing
windfalls in these cases, the government prevents windfalls from occurring
in the first place by paying no more than is necessary to compensate the
owner or to elicit desired behavior. Thus, instead of one lucky windfall
recipient retaining a large gain due to a change in public demand for an
item or activity that the recipient did not anticipate or plan for, society as a
whole shares in the windfall.

271. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, SO
NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1986).
272. See id. at 1459.
273. This statement must be qualified, since determining whether a particular trader is a
"loser" depends on particular circumstances. For instance, a shareholder liquidating her entire
portfolio to raise cash for some pressing expenditure would have traded even with full
knowledge-though she would have received a higher price had the insider made disclosure. A
shareholder selling only a small portion of her portfolio, on the other hand, might have held onto
her shares had she known they were likely to rise in value.
274. This conclusion rests on the pJ;evious analysis demonstrating that insider trading is not a
sensible form of executive compensation and that it does not serve the social purpose of
efficiently pricing securities. See supra text accompanying notes 271-273.
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Why Just Just Compensation?

When the state buys property from its citizens, it (like any other buyer)
attempts to minimize the purchase price. As long as there is an active
market, with multiple competing sellers, the government has no need to use
its power of eminent domain. When the government is trying to buy a
specific piece of property, however, it is in a bilateral monopoly with one
landowner.275 As discussed previously, there may well be a wide range of
prices in which both parties would be happy to contract, and they are likely
to waste time, effort, and resources fighting for favorable terms.276
The law of just compensation provides a simple solution: The
government is required to pay market price and only market price.277
Though the Just Compensation Clause is traditionally viewed as protective
of property rights, this is only half true. While it does prevent the
government from seizing property without any payment, it in effect
mandates that the government gets all the gains from trade with citizens.
Property owners may hold out for any price they like with other buyers, but
the government pays only that price that the property would reach at a fair
and open auction.
There are two reasons why this rule is efficient. First, the situation is
precisely analogous to the private bilateral monopolies discussed
previously.278 The value of the property to the government-the benefit
society will reap from the public project-is difficult to gauge. It certainly
exceeds market value, since that is what the government must pay. The
value of the property to the government also likely exceeds any supramarket, or subjective, value attached to the property by the owner.
Policymakers can thus minimize transaction costs by giving the party likely
to value the property more highly-here, the government-the right to buy
at market value.
· Second, paying anything more than market price would result in
windfalls for those lucky enough to own property needed for public
projects, at the expense of the rest of the population, who would have to pay
higher taxes to fund higher compensation. " [11o permit recovery of value
that is not created by fair, open market conditions would be to award a few
275. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 62, 68-72.
276. See supra text accompanying note 85.
277. For the leading federal case limiting just compensation to market value, see United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). Two states, Florida and Georgia, deviate from this
prevailing rule and require the state to award property owners a portion of the gain due to a public
project See Department of Transp. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1984); Calhoun v. State
Highway Dep't, 153 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. 1967) (declaring the rule established by Hard v. Housing
Authority, 132 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. 1963), constitutionally compelled, and hence not alterable by
statute). See generally 3 SACKMAN, supra note 72, § 8A.02[3]. (describing the minority view that
an enhancement attributable to a proposed public project is recoverable).
278. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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private propertyholders windfall gains solely because of public needs and
exigencies." 279 To finish what is by now a familiar argument, risk-averse
people will find such an eminent-domain lottery unattractive; their expected
wealth is equal in each case and would vary less in a world with lower taxes
and market value compensation than in a world with higher taxes and
supra-market compensation.
What if news of the government's plans leaks out and a speculator buys
a key piece of property at a price above the existing market price but below
the value of the land to the government? This roughly describes the facts of
United States v. Cors,280 in which the Supreme Court held that when the
government condemned boats for use in World War IT, the Just
Compensation Clause required the government to pay only the lower prices
reflecting market conditions before expectations of war increased prices.
While Cors seems consistent with the rule excluding government-created
value from just compensation awards, Richard Posner notes some
complications.
Posner asks if it should make a difference whether the government
requisitioned the boats from people who owned them before the market
price began to rise or from those who bought them from the previous
owners at the current high price.Z81 He writes:
This question brings out the administrative complexity of trying to
base just-compensation law on an aversion to windfalls. Much,
maybe most, of the property the government takes has benefited
from government expenditure. A conspicuous example is land
reclaimed from a lake or river by the Corps of Engineers-but there
is a sense in which all privately owned land benefits from the
public expenditures on maintaining law and order, a title-recording
system, etc. The benefits may long ago have been impounded in the
price of the land, however, so that payment of full compensation
will confer no windfall to anyone. And why confiscate just
condemnees' windfalls?282
Posner seems to fmd Cors a close call; on the one hand he notes that the
holding prevented "a capricious wealth distribution from taxpayers to boat
owners," but on the other hand it seems to lead to the government "taking
too many boats, because it will not consider the competing needs of the
remaining private customers for boats." 283

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less, 605 F.2d 762,782 (5th Cir. 1979).
337 u.s. 325 (1949).
See POSNER, supra note 39, at 65.
ld. at 65-66.
Id. at 65.
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Posner raises four distinct issues. First, there would be unbelievable
"administrative complexity" in trying to capture all windfalls due to value
created by government acts. 284 Of course, to the extent that all citizens
benefit roughly to the same degree, the presumption is that they did pay for
the service via taxes of one stripe or another. Moreover, as emphasized in
Part ll, capture is only worth pursuing in cases of easily identifiable
windfalls of significant size. In the context of condemnation, for instance, it
seems worthwhile to discount the large effect of war demand but pointless
to capture minimal windfalls due to the existence of a recording system, for
which the property owner has paid, again, via income or property taxes.
Second, Posner points out that some owners, like our speculator, will
have paid relatively high prices reflecting the government's planned use.285
As discussed in Part ll, however, the government can in effect put the
citizenry on notice that it stands ready to tax away windfalls. The speculator
then should have known that, per Cors, he should not pay a price that
reflects a windfall to the seller. The windfall tag, in effect, travels with the
assets, so owners cannot capture unearned rents simply by selling the goods
to someone else.
Third, Posner notes that to the extent the government pays prewar
prices for boats during wartime, it will divert boats from other users willing
to pay more and thus, presumably, would put the boats to more valuable
use?86 This economic truism, however, may not apply during a major war.
Mass conscription, rationing, and the like seem to give rise to a
presumption that the war effort comes first-government demand becomes
categorically higher than all other demand?87 Note too that a high
percentage of all private demand was to serve the military activities of the
government, and, assuming the government is rational, it will not bid away
boats for its direct use that would serve the war effort better in private
hands. In wartime, then, we presume the government needs almost
everything more than any other user, and thus condemnation at prewar
prices to prevent windfalls causes little if any misallocation of resources.
Finally, Posner asks "why confiscate just condemnee's windfalls?" 288
This Article answers that the government does capture some other windfalls
and should capture all windfalls that are ascertainable and large enough to
merit the effort. Some of the other windfalls he has in mind are too small or
too difficult to identify. Moreover, putting Cors in a broader context shows
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. The stakes in World War II could hardly have been higher. When skeptically asked what
good resulted from the billions of dollars expended on armaments during the struggle, a Nobel
Prize-winning economist replied, "Well, all we got for those outlays was the salvation of western
civilization." James Tobin, Seminar on Modem Economics at Yale University (Spring 1984).
288. POSNER, supra note 39, at 66.
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that windfall capture can occur in surprising ways. The excess profits taxes
discussed in Subsection IV.B.2.a.i appeared questionable as a tax on
windfalls, but may have been quite sensible as cheap proxies for
condemnation. Eminent domain is much more expensive than simply
purchasing items in markets. Hence, the government typically employs
condemnation power only when no real market exists and transaction costs
are high anyway. When World War IT caused the price of key assets to rise
sharply, the government, per Cors, could have condemned all necessary
war material at lower prewar prices. Instead, it more often pursued a twostep strategy that achieved substantially the same ends via the cheaper
means of (1) market purchases at war-inflated prices, followed by (2) rough
capture of the price difference (excess of wartime over prewar prices) via
the EPT. One commentator described how the existence of the EPT
obviated the need for government agents to drive hard bargains, since they
knew the EPT would capture extraordinary profits and return them to the
public fisc. 289 Recharacterized as a surrogate for direct condemnation of war
supplies, the EPT may have been a quite clever mechanism both to capture
windfalls and minimize the transaction costs of obtaining war supplies.
2. Punitive Damage Awards
Instead of needing specific property in private hands, the government
often wants to encourage behavior that helps enforce the law.
Compensatory damage awards, for instance, force people to weigh the costs
that their acts impose on others and encourages least-cost avoidance of
harms. Thus, the state permits tort victims to sue for compensatory damages
in all cases. Tort law permits recovery of punitive damages, however, in
relatively limited circumstances.
Economic analysis suggests two situations in which punitive damage
awards make sense. First, if a particular type of harmful behavior is difficult
to detect, damages must be increased proportionally so that potential
wrongdoers, on average, expect to pay for the harm they inflict.29° For
example, treble damages under the antitrust acts reflect the difficulty of
detecting and proving collusion in its myriad forms? 91 Second, punitive
289. See CURRAN, supra note 171, at 57.
290. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, Ill HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998). Polinksy and Shaven at times seem to argue that this is
the sole grounds for imposing punitive damages: "[P]unitive damages ordinarily should be
awarded if, and only if, an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes." !d. at
874. It seems, however, that they would limit this statement to corporations and other artificial
legal entities. They note elsewhere that real persons who commit intentional torts should be liable
for punitive damages, even if detection is virtually certain, as it often is for intentional torts like
assault. See id. at 905-10.
291. Implicit in treble damages is a belief that victims detect only one in three violations.
This is a specific example of the general reciprocal rule for calculating punitive damages when
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damages are a sensible means of deterring intentional wrongs. Awarding
victims of negligence more than compensatory damages will tend to
overdeter the productive activity in which the defendant is engaged.292
When the tort is intentional, however, by definition the defendant was
engaged in nonproductive or even counterproductive acts, and thus
overdeterrence is not a worry. To the extent that punitive damages deter
intentional torts, they save society the cost of the torts and the cost of
litigating them.
In either case, punitive damages serve social ends by deterring harmful
behavior that is either difficult to detect or completely unproductive. While
the legal system must award plaintiffs some damages in order to encourage
them to sue wrongdoers and thus deter others from causing harm,
judgments in excess of the harm inflicted-compensatory damages-seem
unnecessary to induce lawsuits and hence are a windfall.293 The one
antitrust plaintiff in three that detects collusion, for example, collects its
actual damages and then twice that sum again. While it is important to
assess such a fme against the wrongdoer, there is no reason the award must
go to the plaintiff.
Courts have long realized the windfall nature of punitive damages.
Over a century ago, one judge found it "difficult to understand why, if the
tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the
compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is
punished." 294 Members of the Supreme Court continue to express
puzzlement over the payment of punitive damages to the plaintiff instead of
the state.295 The leading torts treatise avers that" [i]t is generally agreed that

detection is less than certain: Multiply actual damages by one over the odds of detection. Thus,
the lower the odds of detection, the greater the damages assessed against the wrongdoers caught
If plaintiffs detect one in three violations, the rule calls for treble damages; if they detect only one
in 10, punitive damages should be 10 times actual damages.
More sophisticated approaches account for additional features of real-world litigation. For
example, if the expense and risk of a lawsuit deters some plaintiffs who detect wrongs from suing,
the reciprocal rule must reflect this by jacking up damages even higher. See id. at 921.
292. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 227. Thus, assessing punitive damages equal to 10 times
actual damages in automobile torts would certainly cause drivers to exercise more care, but
probably too much care-possibly to the point of ceasing the activity entirely. Driving is a very
productive activity, economically speaking, and excessive penalties for negligence may cost more
in precautionary behavior than they gamer in reduced accidents.
293. An important assumption here is that compensatory damages do indeed fully
compensate victims so that punitive damages are not needed as some sort of ad hoc supplement to
bring compensatory damages up to actual damages.
294. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877).
295. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Punitive
damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs .... [T]he penalty should go to the State,
not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated."); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("These awards are not to compensate victims;
they are only windfalls.").
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punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff." 296 There has been a deluge
of recent law review commentary condemning punitive damages as a
windfall to plaintiffs and calling for reform. 297
It appears that awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff is a
historical/procedural artifact. "Although · not meant to . compensate a
plaintiff, [punitive damages] increase his recovery. He is the fortuitous
beneficiary of such an award simply because there is no one else to receive
it." 298 The obvious alternative is to award punitive damages to the state.
Judges generally have been hesitant about taking such a step themselves. 299
Legislatures in a number of states have passed so-called decoupling statutes
that award the state a significant share of punitive damages, ranging up to
seventy-five percent.300 Taxing away the entire punitive damages award,
like any 100% tax, would be counterproductive: Plaintiffs would have no
incentive to incur the additional expense of litigating for punitive as well as

296. W. PAGEKEETONET AL., PROSSERANDKEETONON1HELAWOFTORTS § 2, at 14 (5th
ed. 1984).
297. See, e.g., E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
839, 841 (1993) ("One criticism, the 'windfall theory' of punitive damages, is that punitive
damages are an unjust windfall to civil plaintiffs."); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1165 (1984)
(" [P]unitive damages simply provide a windfall to the plaintiff , penalize the innocent consumers
of society, and unnecessarily sap the vitality of the economy upon which society is totally
dependent"); James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the
Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1992) (stating that "commentators and
courts uniformly [maintain] that punitive damage awards amount to a windfall for plaintiffs, who
have already been fully compensated by ordinary compensatory damages" (footnote omitted));
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1900, 1907 (1992) ("From the plaintiffs perspective, [a large punitive damage
award] amounts to the legal equivalent of a winning lottery ticket"); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The
Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 473, 481 (1993) (finding a "public perception that punitive damages are nothing
but a windfall to plaintiffs"); Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility of Full State
Extraction of Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 301, 303 (1994) (advocating "full
statutory extraction of punitive damages as a means of taking the windfall of punitive damages
away from the plaintiff and compensating society for the injury the defendant inflicted upon it");
see also TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON 1HE LIABILITY CRISIS 52 (1987)
(" [P]unitive damages by their very nature do not serve to compensate plaintiffs. They are a pure
windfall, whose only legitimate purpose is to deter truly outrageous and harmful conduct.").
298. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657,662 (Iowa 1971) (emphasis added).
299. At least one judge has eschewed such passivity and declared that courts have the
inherent common-law power, even absent legislation, to divert punitive damage awards from
plaintiffs to the state. See Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins., 577 So. 2d 878, 886-87 (Ala. 1991)
(Shores, J., concurring). Justice Shores elaborated on the theme in Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion
for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards To Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA.
L. REv. 61 (1992). Her colleagues have seemingly found her arguments convincing. See, e.g.,
Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992) (using similar reasoning).
300. For a fairly recent collection of citations to state statutes decoupling punitive damage
awards, see BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 617-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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compensatory damages. 301 Courts have reached divergent opinions about
the constitutionality of these legislative attempts to alter the common law. 302
This flurry of commentary and legislation has coincided with new
theoretical attacks on plaintiffs' punitive damage windfalls. While it is in
one sense true that "from the pure perspective of deterrence, the windfall
concept is irrelevant," 303 in that potential defendants are equally deterred by
payments to plaintiffs or the state, this ignores the administrative costs of
the legal system. There is evidence that litigation costs in a given suit
increase with the amount of damages at stake.304 If so, "[d]ecoupling
mitigates the propensity of punitive damages awards to encourage
unnecessary litigation, but does not dilute deterrence because defendants'
damage payments are unaffected." 305
This Article's twin reasons for capturing windfalls provide additional
grounds for diverting punitive damages from plaintiffs to the state. First,
plaintiffs (hopefully) do not make plans to become victims eligible for
punitive damage awards, and hence taxing away even a large portion of
punitive damage awards will not discourage plaintiffs from bringing suits
and deterring difficult-to-detect or intentional torts. Thus, decoupling
statutes are an efficient way for the state to raise revenue. Second, in an
argument no doubt familiar by now, punitive damage awards ex ante are an
unattractive lottery for a risk-averse population. Reliably lower taxes and
no chance for a punitive damages windfall offer the same average result as
higher taxes and a chance to win the punitive damages lottery, but with
greater predictability.
3. Criminal Windfalls
The legal system grants windfalls not only to civil litigants in the form
of punitive damages, but also to criminal defendants. For instance, even
those admitting guilt may escape punishment if the government does not

301. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
302. One state court has held that decoupling statutes violate the Takings Clause, see Kirk v.
Denver Publ'g, 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a Colorado statute violated the
Takings Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions), while others have rejected such
challenges, see, e.g., Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd per
curiam, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Shepherd Components v. Brice Petrides, 472 N.W.2d 612
(Iowa 1991). Another court found that a decoupling statute, since it introduced the state into
private litigation, violated the Excessive Fines and Due Process Clauses. See McBride v. General
Motors, 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that a Georgia statute violated the Excessive
Fines Provision and Due Process Clause of the Georgia and federal Constitutions). For a decision
reaching the opposite conclusion, see Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
303. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 58 (1990).
304. See Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 290, at 923.
305. Id.
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provide a speedy trial. 306 Perhaps the most well-known criminal windfall is
the exclusionary rule. Under the modem interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment/07 courts must exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search
or seizure, regardless of how probative it may be of the defendant's guilt.308
If excluding evidence obtained illegally was the most effective way to deter
the police from engaging in illegal searches and seizures, the exclusionary
rule would not be a windfall for criminals; it would simply be the
(cheapest) price for upholding a constitutional provision.
A growing chorus of critics, however, have suggested that the
exclusionary rule is not the most effective way to deter officials from
violating Fourth Amendment rights. First and perhaps foremost, it can
overdeter.309 If the police are worried that the smallest technical misstep
will result in exclusion of evidence,310 they may forgo perfectly legitimate
searches, and, as a result, criminals will escape arrest and likely commit
more crimes. Second, it can underdeter: The exclusionary rule "awards
windfalls to guilty criminal defendants while offering nothing at all to the
innocent whose rights are equally violated." 311 Third, the exclusionary rule
is an ali-or-nothing remedy; there is no way to tailor the penalty to the
severity of the constitutional violation. Looking in a glove compartment of
a car becomes the legal.equivalent of breaking down the front door in the
middle of the night, body-searching every member of the family, and rifling
through every drawer in the house. Finally, the rule can lead to legal
outcomes clearly at variance with the truth and thus undermine faith in the
legal system. 312
Just as decoupling statutes maintain deterrence against private
tortfeasors while offering a host of advantages over letting plaintiffs retain
punitive damage awards, critics of the exclusionary rule believe that other
remedies exist that will effectively deter police misconduct without the
litany of disadvantages just discussed. By eliminating a windfall for guilty
defendants, the criminal justice system can have its cake-legal searches
and seizures-and eat it too--more precisely tailored deterrence and
conviction of the guilty regardless of the provenance of evidence.

306. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
307. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
308. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
309. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 749.
310. Few areas of law can rival the hypertechnical distinctions the courts have drawn
between legal and illegal searches. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 3.2 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995) ("Protected Areas and Interests"); id.,
§ 3.8 ("Stop and Frisk and Similar Lesser Intrusions").
311. CarolS. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820, 848
(1994).
312. See generally JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993)
(outlining at length the problems with constitutional protections of criminal defendants).
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The prime candidate to replace the exclusionary rule is damage awards
against officials who engage in illegal searches and seizures. Another
scholar suggests reducing the sentences of criminals convicted with
illegally obtained evidenc~. 313 Judges can calibrate these alternatives to
match the seriousness of any constitutional violation, and, for this reason,
overdeterrence is unlikely. Damages have the advantage of providing a
remedy for the innocent as well as the guilty. Both vindicate the important
social goal of rendering judgments that reflect the truth. If either or both of
the alternative remedies can deter police misconduct at least as effectively
as the exclusionary rule, they offer a host of additional benefits to society
instead of a windfall to the guilty.
Criminal procedure reform seems a long way from the Windfall Profit
Tax on Oil. Although the means differ significantly, society's goal in both
cases-and in every other example studied in this Part-is identical: Take
windfalls from their recipients and share the bounty with everyone. Thus,
there is a unifying theme behind the disparate legal rules, an important
theme for policymaking. That elected governments have seen fit to
effectuate windfall capture in such a wide variety of circumstances is strong
evidence that people are risk-averse regarding upside risk and desire
sharing rules.
V. CONCLUSION

Optimal tax theory and individuals' risk aversion provide powerful
efficiency justifications for capturing large and easily identified windfallsgains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that
society wishes to reward. These redistributions can impose significant
transaction and administrative costs and, moreover, can undermine
incentives to behave productively. Thus, this Article has tempered
optimism about windfall capture with cautionary discussions of contexts in
which windfalls do not exist or the costs of capture exceed the benefits.
For example, capture is never desirable for private windfalls, where the
number of winners and losers is relatively small. Misunderstanding what
constitutes a windfall, courts overseeing private litigation often ignore the
value of planning, identify windfalls where none exist, and undermine the
incentives to engage in prudent forethought. Ironically, the very term
windfall arose from a practice that likely involved nothing akin to an
unearned gain.314 It seems highly unlikely that the Crown and its nobles,
lords of the medieval English forests, would have permitted peasants to

313. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757,
796 (1994).
314. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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haul away windfallen branches that could have been harvested at any
noticeable profit. The value of the wood shorn from trees as a result of
storms, then, probably exceeded the labor cost of collecting it by only a
small margin. The sovereign and the lords, it seems, simply abandoned their
rights to a resource not worth recovering for commercial purposes. Peasants
able to harvest the fallen branches at the least cost (for example, those
living closest to the forests or those with the lowest opportunity cost for
their time) would derive some marginal benefit from the free source of
wood. This woodgathering differed little from modern-day soda can
gathering: The recovery by the poor of low-value property abandoned by
the (relatively) wealthy. Thus, the original windfall was no windfall at all.
When private windfalls actually exist, it is often too expensive to return
the subject property to its true owner. In such cases, there are often wider
social goals that dictate which party should get the windfall. Even when
there is no societal interest at stake, attempted state capture of most private
windfalls is not feasible: The costs of detection are high, and all the
government accomplishes by imposing a windfall tax is to raise transaction
costs among those few parties with knowledge of the lucky gain.
For public windfalls, where the number of winners and losers is large,
detection is cheap and easy. Still, policymakers must proceed with caution
in this context as well. Misguided capture mechanisms, such as the wartime
excess profits taxes, fail to account properly for high administrative and
deadweight costs. There is good reason to believe, however, that the
Windfall Profit Tax on Oil provides a model for efficient capture. While
necessarily complex, windfall capture mechanisms are becoming steadily
more feasible for wealthier societies possessing powerful tools to gather
and process information.
It is impossible to anticipate where and when future public windfalls
will arise; by definition such events are surprises. Some hypothetical
examples, however, help illustrate how modern states' expanding ability to
gather and digest information may help separate windfallen chaff from
earned wheat. Assume that later patent Y makes earlier patent X much more
valuable in a way that, given the details of patent X, the inventor of X
clearly never anticipated. If the state can make this determination with
confidence, it should tax away the royalties earned by X that are attributable
to Y. Similarly, the surprising growth of the Internet may make all the wires
going into private homes more valuable as they become conduits for Web
material in addition to data they were originally designed to carry (voice for
phone wiring, video for cable television). If the companies never expected
this incremental revenue stream, the state has a strong case for taxing away
telephone and cable companies' profits due to Internet use. A government
able to gather and analyze extensive data on the telephone and cable
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industries may be able to determine with sufficient confidence that their
gains from the explosion in Internet use were largely unexpected windfalls.
Even when the case for capture is not clear, the windfall concept is a
useful tool for thinking about a variety of issues, from progressive taxation
to escheat, from insider trading to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule. In all of these contexts, this Article has offered a consistent way to
think about how society should deal with unearned benefits.
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